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Abstract
The recently initiated approach called computability logic is a formal theory of
interactive computation. It understands computational problems as games played
by a machine against its environment, and uses logical formalism to describe valid
principles of computability, with formulas representing computational problems and
logical operators standing for operations on computational problems. The concept
of computability that lies under this approach is a generalization of Church-Turing
computability from simple, two-step (question/answer, input/output) problems to
problems of arbitrary degrees of interactivity. Restricting this concept to predicates,
which are understood as computational problems of zero degree of interactivity,
yields exactly classical truth. This makes computability logic a generalization and
refinement of classical logic.
The foundational paper “Introduction to computability logic” [Annals of Pure and
Applied Logic 123 (2003), pp. 1-99] was focused on semantics rather than syntax,
and certain axiomatizability assertions in it were only stated as conjectures. The
present contribution contains a verification of one of such conjectures: a soundness
and completeness proof for the deductive system CL3 which axiomatizes the most
basic first-order fragment of computability logic called the finite-depth, elementary-
base fragment. CL3 is a conservative extention of classical predicate calculus in the
language which, along with all of the (appropriately generalized) logical operators of
classical logic, contains propositional connectives and quantifiers representing the so
called choice operations. The atoms of this language are interpreted as elementary
problems, i.e. predicates in the standard sense. Among the potential application ar-
eas forCL3 are the theory of interactive computation, constructive applied theories,
knowledgebase systems, systems for resource-bound planning and action.
This paper is self-contained as it reintroduces all relevant definitions as well as
main motivations. It is meant for a wide audience and does not assume that the
reader has specialized knowledge in any particular subarea of logic or computer
science.
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1 Introduction
The question “What can be computed?” is fundamental to theoretical com-
puter science. The approach initiated recently in [11], called computability
logic, is about answering this question in a systematic way using logical for-
malism, with formulas understood as computational problems and logical op-
erators as operations on computational problems.
The collection of operators used in [11] to form the language of computability
logic can be seen as a non-disjoint union of those of classical, intuitionistic and
— in a very generous sense — linear logics, with the computational semantics
of classical operators fully consistent with their standard meaning, and the
semantics of the intuitionistic-logic and “linear-logic” operators formalizing
the (so far rather abstract) computability and resource intuitions tradition-
ally associated with those two logics. This collection captures a set of most
basic and natural operations on computational problems. But it generally re-
mains, and will apparently always remain, open to different sorts of interesting
extensions, depending on particular needs and taste. Some of such extensions
are outlined in [13]. Due to the fact that the language of computability logic
has no clear-cut boundaries, every technical result in this area will deal with
some fragment of that logic rather than the whole logic. The result presented
in this paper concerns what in [11] was called the finite-depth, elementary-base
fragment.
This fragment is axiomatized as a rather unusual type of a deductive sys-
tem called CL3. It is a conservative extension of classical first-order logic
in a language obtained by incorporating into the formalism of the latter the
“additive” and “multiplicative” groups of to what we — with strong reser-
vations — referred as “linear-logic operators”. The main technical result of
this paper is a proof of soundness and completeness for CL3 with respect to
computability semantics. A secondary result is a proof of decidability for the
classical-quantifier-free (yet first-order) fragment of CL3. These proofs are
given in Part 2. Part 1 is mainly devoted to a relatively brief (re)introduction
to the relevant fragment and relevant aspects of computability logic, serving
Email address: giorgi.japaridze@villanova.edu (Giorgi Japaridze ).
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the purpose of keeping the paper self-contained both technically and motiva-
tionally. A more detailed and fundamental introduction to computability logic
can be found in [11]. A considerably less technical and more compact — yet
comprehensive and self-contained — overview of computability logic is given
in [13], reading which is most recommended for the first acquaintance with
the subject and for a better appreciation of the import of the present results.
The soundness and completeness of the propositional fragment CL1 of CL3
has been proven in [12].
Traditionally construed computational problems correspond to interfaces in
transformational programs where the interaction between a system and its
environment is simple and consists of two steps: querying the system and
generating an answer. The computational problems that our approach deals
with are more general in that the underlying interfaces may have arbitrary
complexity. Such problems and the corresponding computations can be called
interactive as they model potentially long dialogues between the system and
the environment. From the technical point of view, computability logic is a
game logic, because it defines interactive computations as games. There is
an extensive literature on “game-style” models of computation in theoretical
computer science: alternating Turing machines, interactive proof systems etc.,
that are typically only interesting in the context of computational complexity.
Our approach, which is concerned with computability rather than complexity
and deals with deterministic rather than nondeterministic choices, at present
is only remotely related to that line of research, and the similarity is more
terminological than conceptual. From the other, ‘games in logic’ or ‘game
semantics for linear logic’ line, the closest to our present study appears to be
Blass’s work [3], and less so some later studies by Abramsky, Jagadeesan ([1]),
Hyland, Ong ([6]) and others. See [11] for discussions of how other approaches
compare with ours.
There are considerable overlaps between the motivations and philosophies of
linear (as well as intuitionistic) and computability logics, based on which [11]
employed some linear-logic terminology. It should be pointed out, however,
that computability logic is by no means about linear logic. Unlike most of the
other game semantics approaches, it is not an attempt to use games to con-
struct good models for Girard’s linear logic, Heyting’s intuitionistic calculus
or any other, already given popular syntactic targets. Rather, computability
logic evolves by the more and only natural scheme ‘from semantics to syntax’:
it views games as foundational entities in their own right, and then explores
the logical principles validated by them. Its semantics, in turn, follows the
scheme ‘from truth to computability’. It starts from the classical concept of
truth and generalizes it to the more constructive, meaningful and useful con-
cept of computability. As we are going to see, classical truth is nothing but a
special case of computability; correspondingly, classical logic is nothing but a
special fragment of computability logic and of CL3 in particular.
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The scope of the significance of our study is not limited to logic or theory of
computing. As we will see later and more convincingly demonstrated in [11]
and [13], some other application areas include constructive applied theories,
knowledgebase systems, or resource-bound systems for planning and action.
PART I
This part briefly reintroduces the subject and states the main results of the
paper.
2 Computational problems
The concept of computability on which the semantics of our logic is based is
a natural but nontrivial generalization of Church-Turing computability from
simple, two-step (question/answer, or input/output) problems to problems
of arbitrary degrees and forms of interactivity where, in the course of inter-
action between the machine and the environment, input and output can be
multiple and interlaced, perhaps taking place throughout the entire process of
computation rather than just at the beginning (input) and the end (output)
as this is the case with simple problems. Technically the concept is defined
in terms of games: an interactive computational problem/task is a game be-
tween a machine and the environment, where dynamic input steps are called
environment’s moves, and output steps called machine’s moves.
The necessity in having a clear mathematical model of interactive computation
hardly requires any justification: after all, most tasks that real computers and
computer networks perform are truly interactive. And this sort of tasks can-
not always be reduced to simple series of (the well-studied and well-modeled)
two-step tasks. E.g., interactive tasks involving multiple concurrent subtasks
naturally generate situations/positions where both parties may have mean-
ingful actions to take, and it may be up to the player whether to try to
make a move or wait to see how things evolve, perhaps performing some vital
computations while waiting and watching. 1 It is unclear whether the steps
corresponding to such situations should be labeled as ‘machine-to-move’ or
‘environment-to-move’, which makes it impossible to break the whole process
into consecutive pairs or alternately-labeled steps.
Standard game-semantical approaches that understand players’ strategies as
functions from positions to moves 2 fail to capture the substance of interac-
1 See Sections 3 and 15 of [11] for more detailed discussions and examples.
2 Often some additional restrictions are imposed on this sort of strategies. Say, in
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tion in full generality, as they essentially try to reduce interactive processes
to simple chains of question/answer events. This is so because the ‘strat-
egy=function’ approach inherently only works when at every step of the play
the player who is expected to make a move is uniquely determined. Let us call
this sort of games strict. Strictness is typically achieved by having what in [2]
is called procedural rules or equivalent — rules strictly regulating who and
when should move, the most standard procedural rule being the one according
to which players should take turns in alternating order.
One of the main novel and distinguishing features of our games among the
other concepts of games studied in the logical literature — including the one
tackled by the author [7] earlier — is the absence of procedural rules, based
on which our games can be called free. In these games, either player is free to
make any move at any time. Instead of having procedural rules common for
all games, each particular game comes with its own what we call structural
rules. These are rules telling what moves are legal for a given player in a
given position. Making an illegal move by a player is possible but it results in
a loss for that player. The difference between procedural and structural rules
is not just terminological. Unlike the standard procedural rules that allow only
one player to move (at least move without penalty) in every given situation,
structural rules can be arbitrarily lenient. In particular, they do not necessarily
have to satisfy the condition that in every position at most one of the players
may have legal moves. When, however, this condition still is satisfied, we
essentially get the above-mentioned strict type of a game: the structural rules
of such a game can be thought of as procedural rules according to which the
player that is expected to move in a given non-terminal position is the (now
uniquely determined) one that has legal moves in that position. Strict games
are thus special cases of our more general free games. The latters present a
more adequate and apparently universal modeling tool for interactive tasks.
Strategies for playing free games can and should no longer be defined as func-
tions from positions to moves. In the next section we will define them as
higher-level entities called play machines.
To define our games formally, we fix several classes of objects and dedicated
(meta-) variables for them. By placing the common name for objects between
braces we denote the set of all objects of that type. Say, {variables} stands
for the set of all variables. These objects are:
• Variables, with {variables} = {v0, v1, v2}. Letters x, y, z will be used as
metavariables for variables.
• Constants, with {constants} = {0, 1, 2, . . .}. Letter c will be used as a
metavariable for constants.
Abramsky’s tradition, strategies only look at the other player’s immediately pre-
ceeding moves.
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• Terms, with {terms} = {variables} ∪ {constants}. Letter t will be used as
a metavariable for terms.
• Valuations, defined as any functions of the type {variables} → {constants}.
A metavariable for valuations: e. Each valuation e extends to a function of
the type {terms} → {constants} by stipulating that, for every constant c,
e(c) = c.
• Moves, defined as any finite strings over the standard keyboard alphabet
plus the symbol ♠. Metavariables for moves: α, β.
• Players, with {players} = {⊤,⊥}. Here and from now on ⊤ and ⊥ are
symbolic names for the machine and the environment, respectively. Letter
℘ will range over players, with ¬℘ meaning “℘’s adversary”, i.e. the player
that is not ℘.
• Labeled moves, or labmoves. They are defined as any moves prefixed
with ⊤ or ⊥, with such a prefix (label) indicating who has made the move.
• Runs, defined as any (finite or infinite) sequences of labmoves. Metavari-
ables for runs: Γ,∆.
• Positions, defined as any finite runs. A metavariable for positions: Φ.
Runs and positions will often be delimited with “〈” and “〉”, with 〈〉 thus
denoting the empty run. The meaning of an expression such as 〈Φ, ℘α,Γ〉
must be clear: this is the result of appending to the position Φ the position
〈℘α〉 and then the run Γ.
Definition 2.1 A game is a pair A = (LrA,WnA), where:
• LrA is a function that sends each valuation e to a set LrAe of runs, such that
the following two conditions are satisfied:
(a) A run is in LrAe iff all of its nonempty finite initial segments are in Lr
A
e .
(b) No run containing the (whatever-labeled) move ♠ is in LrAe .
Elements of LrAe are called legal runs of A with respect to e, and all other
runs called illegal. In particular, if the last move of the shortest illegal
initial segment of Γ is ℘-labeled, then Γ is said to be a ℘-illegal run of A
with respect to e.
• WnA is a function of the type {valuations} × {runs} → {players} such
that, writing WnAe 〈Γ〉 for Wn
A(e,Γ), the following condition is satisfied:
(c) If Γ is a ℘-illegal run of A with respect to e, then WnAe 〈Γ〉 = ¬℘.
To what we earlier referred as “structural rules” are thus represented by the
Lr component of a game, and we call it the structure of that game. The
meaning of theWn component, called the content, is that it tells us who has
won a given run of the game. When WnAe 〈Γ〉 = ℘, we say that Γ is a ℘-won
(or won by ℘) run of A with respect to e.
Just as predicates (their truth values) in classical logic generally depend on
how certain variables are interpreted, so do games: both the structure and the
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content of a game take valuation e as a parameter. We will typically omit this
parameter when it is irrelevant or clear from the context.
Meaning by an illegal move a move adding which (with the corresponding
label) to the given position makes it illegal, condition (a) of Definition 2.1
corresponds to the intuition that a run is legal iff no illegal moves have been
made in it. This automatically makes the empty run 〈〉 a legal run of every
game. Our selection of the set of moves is very generous, and it is natural and
technically very convenient to assume that certain moves will never be legal.
According to condition (b), ♠ is such a move. As for condition (c), it tells us
that an illegal run is always lost by the player who has made the first illegal
move.
We say that a game A depends on a variable x iff there are two valuations
e1 and e2 that agree on all variables except x such that either Lr
A
e1 6= Lr
A
e2 or
WnAe1 6=Wn
A
e2
.
A game A is said to be finitary iff there is a finite set ~x of variables such
that, for any two valuations e1 and e2 that agree on all variables from ~x, we
have LrAe1 = Lr
A
e2
and WnAe1 = Wn
A
e2
. Otherwise A is infinitary. One can
easily show that for each finitary game A there is a unique smallest set ~x that
satisfies the above condition — in particular, the elements of this ~x are exactly
the variables on which A depends. A finitary game that depends on exactly n
variables is said to be n-ary.
A constant game means a 0-ary game. There is a natural operation, called
instantiation, of the type {valuations}×{games}→{constant games}. The
result of applying this operation to (e, A) is denoted e[A]. Intuitively, e[A] is
the constant game obtained from A by fixing the values of all variables to the
constants assigned to them by e. Formally, game e[A] is defined by stipulating
that, for any valuation e′, Lr
e[A]
e′ = Lr
A
e and Wn
e[A]
e′ = Wn
A
e . This makes e
′
irrelevant, so that it can be omitted and we can just write Lre[A] and Wne[A].
For any game A, these two expressions mean the same as LrAe and Wn
A
e .
Games whose Lr component does not depend on the valuation parameter are
said to be unistructural. Constant games are thus special cases of unistruc-
tural games where the Wn component does not depend on valuation, either.
Formally, a game A is unistructural iff, for any two valuations e1 and e2,
LrAe1 = Lr
A
e2
.
We say that a game A is finite-depth iff there is a (smallest) integer n, called
the depth of A, such that, for every valuation e and run Γ with Γ ∈ LrAe , the
length of Γ does not exceed n. Games of depth 0 are said to be elementary.
Thus, elementary games are games that have no legal moves: the empty run 〈〉
is the only legal run of such games. This automatically makes all elementary
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games unistructural.
Constant elementary games are said to be trivial. Obviously there are exactly
two trivial games. We denote them by the same symbols ⊤ and ⊥ as we use for
the two players. In particular, ⊤ is the (unique) trivial game withWn⊤〈〉 = ⊤,
and ⊥ is the (unique) trivial game with Wn⊥〈〉 = ⊥.
Let us agree to understand classical predicates — in particular, predicates
on {0, 1, 2, . . .}— as functions from valuations to {⊤,⊥} rather than, as more
commonly done, functions from tuples of constants to {⊤,⊥}. Say, x > y is
the predicate that is true at a valuation e (returns ⊤ for it) iff e(x) > e(y).
This understanding of predicates is technically more convenient, and is also
slightly more general as it captures infinite-arity predicates along with finite-
arity ones.
All elementary games have the same structure, so their trivial Lr component
can be ignored and each such game identified with itsWn component; further-
more, by setting the run parameter to its only relevant value 〈〉 in such games,
Wn becomes a function of the type {valuations} → {players}, i.e. exactly
what we call a predicate. We thus get a natural one-to-one correspondence
between elementary games and predicates: every predicate p can be thought
of as the (unique) elementary game A such that WnAe 〈〉 = ⊤ iff p is true at e;
and vice versa: every elementary game A thought of as the predicate p that is
true at e iff WnAe 〈〉 = ⊤. With this correspondence in mind, we will be using
the terms “predicate” and “elementary game” as synonyms. So, computability
logic understands each predicate p as a game of zero degree of interactivity,
(the only legal run 〈〉 of) which is automatically won by the machine if p is true,
and lost if p is false. This makes the classical concept of predicates a special
case of our concept of computational problems; correspondingly, the classical
concept of truth is going to be a special case of our concept of computability
— in particular, computability restricted to elementary games.
The class of games in the above-defined sense is general enough to model
anything that we would call a (two-player, two-outcome) interactive problem.
However, it is too general. There are games where the chances of a player
to succeed essentially depend on the relative speed at which its adversary
responds and, as it is not clear what particular speed would be natural to
assume for the environment, we do not want to consider that sort of games
meaningful computational problems. A simple example would be the game
where all non-♠ moves are legal and that is won by the player who moves
first. This is merely a contest of speed.
Below we define a subclass of games called static. Intuitively, static games are
games where speed is irrelevant: in order to succeed, only matters what to do
(strategy) rather than how fast to do (speed).
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We say that a run ∆ is a ℘-delay of a run Γ iff the following two conditions
are satisfied:
• for each player ℘′, the subsequence of the ℘′-labeled moves of ∆ is the same
as that of Γ, and
• for any n, k ≥ 1, if the nth ℘-labeled move is made later than (is to the
right of) the kth ¬℘-labeled move in Γ, then so is it in ∆.
The above means that in ∆ each player has made the same sequence of moves
as in Γ, only, in ∆, ℘ might have been acting with some delay.
Definition 2.2 A game A is said to be static iff, whenever WnAe 〈Γ〉 = ℘
and ∆ is a ℘-delay of Γ, we have WnAe 〈∆〉 = ℘.
Roughly, in a static game, if a player can succeed when acting fast, it will
remain equally successful acting the same way but slowly. This releases the
player from any pressure for time and allows it to select its own pace for the
game. The following fact is a rather straightforward observation:
Proposition 2.3 All elementary games are static.
One of the main theses on which computability logic relies philosophically is
that the concept of static games is an adequate formal counterpart of our
intuitive notion of “pure”, speed-independent computational problems. See
Section 4 of [11] for a detailed discussion and examples in support of this
thesis.
Now we are ready to formally clarify what we mean by computational prob-
lems: we use the term “(interactive) computational problem” (or simply
“problem”) as a synonym of “static game”.
As shown in [11] (Proposition 4.8), all strict games are static. But not vice
versa. The class of static games is substantially more general, and is free of
the limitations of strict games discussed earlier. The closure of the set of all
predicates under the game operations that we will define in Section 4 forms a
natural class of static yet free games. Section 3 of [11] shows an example of a
natural problem from this class that is impossible to model with strict games.
3 Computability
The definitions that we give in this section are semiformal and incomplete.
All of the omitted technical details are however rather standard and can be
easily restored by anyone familiar with Turing machines. If necessary, the
corresponding detailed definitions can be found in Part II of [11].
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The central point of our philosophy is to require that agent ⊤ be imple-
mentable as a computer program, with effective and fully determined behavior.
On the other hand, the behavior (including speed) of agent ⊥, who represents
a capricious user or the blind forces of nature, can be arbitrary. This intuition
is captured by the model of interactive computation where ⊤ is formalized as
what we call HPM.
An HPM (hard-play machine) H is a Turing machine with the capability
of making moves. At any time, the current position of the game is fully visible
to this machine, as well as it is fully informed about the valuation with respect
to which the outcome of the play will be evaluated. This effect is achieved by
letting the machine have — along with the ordinary read/write work tape—
two additional read-only tapes: the valuation tape and the run tape. The
former spells some valuation e by listing constants in the lexicographic order
of the corresponding variables. Its contents remain unchanged throughout the
work of the machine. As for the run tape, it serves as a dynamic input, spelling,
at any time, the current position of the game. Every time one of the players
makes a move, that move (with the corresponding label) is automatically
appended to the contents of the run tape.
As always, the computation proceeds in discrete steps, also called clock cy-
cles. The technical details about how exactly H makes a move α are not very
interesting, but for clarity let us say that this is done by constructing α in a
certain section (say, the beginning) of the work tape and then entering one
of the specially designated states called move states. Thus, H can make at
most one move per clock cycle. On the other hand, as we noted, there are no
limitations to the relative speed of the environment, so the latter can make
any finite number of moves per cycle. We assume that the run tape remains
stable during a clock cycle and is updated only on a transition from one cy-
cle to another. Again, there is flexibility in arranging details regarding what
happens if both of the players make moves “simultaneously”. For clarity, we
assume that if, during a given cycle, H makes a move α and the environment
makes moves β1, . . . , βn, then the position spelled on the run tape through-
out the next cycle will be the result of appending 〈⊥β1, . . . ,⊥βn,⊤α〉 to the
current position.
A configuration of H is defined in the standard way: this is a full description
of the (“current”) state of the machine, the locations of its three scanning
heads, and the contents of its tapes, with the exception that, in order to make
finite descriptions of configurations possible, we do not formally include a
description of the unchanging contents of the valuation tape as a part of con-
figuration, but rather account for it in our definition of computation branches
as this will be seen shortly. The initial configuration is the configuration
where H is in its initial state and the work and run tapes are empty. A configu-
ration C ′ is said to be an e-successor of a configuration C iff, when valuation
10
e is spelled on the valuation tape, C ′ can legally follow C in the standard
(standard for multitape Turing machines) sense, based on the transition func-
tion of the machine and accounting for the possibility of the above-described
nondeterministic updates of the contents of the run tape. An e-computation
branch of H is a sequence of configurations of H where the first configura-
tion is the initial configuration and every other configuration is an e-successor
of the previous one. Thus, the set of all e-computation branches captures all
possible scenarios corresponding to different behaviors by ⊥.
Each e-computation branch B of H incrementally spells (in the obvious sense)
some run Γ on the run tape, which we call the run spelled by B. Then, for
a game A, we write H |=e A (“H wins A on e”) iff, whenever B is an e-
computation branch of H and Γ the run spelled by B, we have WnAe 〈Γ〉 = ⊤.
And we write H |= A iff H |=e A for every valuation e. The meaning of H |= A
is that H wins (computes, solves) A. Finally, we write |= A and say that A
is winnable (computable, solvable) iff there is an HPM H with H |= A.
The above “hard-play” model of interactive computation seemingly strongly
favors the environment in that the latter may be arbitrarily faster than the
machine. What happens if we start limiting the speed of the environment?
The answer is: nothing as far as computational problems are concerned. The
model of computation called EPM takes the idea if limiting the speed of
the environment to the extreme, yet it yields the same class of computable
problems.
An EPM (easy-play machine) is defined in the same way as an HPM,
with the only difference that now the environment can (but is not obligated
to) make a move only when the machine explicitly allows it to do so, the
event that we call granting permission. Technically permission is granted
by entering one of the specially designated states called permission states.
The only requirement that the machine is expected to satisfy is that, as long
as the adversary plays legal, the machine should grant permission every once
in a while; how long that “while” lasts, however, is totally up to the machine.
This amounts to having full control over the speed of the adversary.
The above intuition is formalized as follows. We say that an e-computation
branch B of a given EPM is fair if permission is granted infinitely many times
in B. A fair EPM is an EPM whose every e-computation branch (for every
valuation e) is fair. For an EPM E and valuation e, we write E |=e A (“E
wins A on e”) iff, whenever B is an e-computation branch of E and Γ the
run spelled by B, we have:
• WnAe 〈Γ〉 = ⊤, and
• B is fair unless Γ is a ⊥-illegal run of A with respect to e.
Just as with HPMs, for an EPM E , E |= A (“E wins (computes, solves)
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A”) means that E |=e A for every valuation e. Note that when we deal with
fair EPMs, the second one of the above two conditions is always satisfied, and
then the definition of |=e is literally the same as in the case of HPMs.
Remark 3.1 When trying to show that a given EPM wins a given game, it
is always perfectly safe to assume that the environment never makes an illegal
move, for if it does, the machine automatically wins (unless the machine itself
has made an illegal move earlier, in which case it does not matter what the
environment did afterwards anyway, so that we may still assume that the
environment did not make any illegal moves). Making such an assumption
can often significantly simplify computability proofs.
The following fact, proven in [11] (Theorem 17.2), establishes equivalence be-
tween the two models for computational problems:
Proposition 3.2 For any static game A, the following statements are equiv-
alent:
(i) there is an EPM that wins A;
(ii) there is an HPM that wins A;
(iii) there is a fair EPM that wins A.
Moreover, there is an effective procedure that converts any EPM (resp. HPM)
M into an HPM (resp. fair EPM) N such that, for every static game A and
valuation e, N |=e A whenever M |=e A.
The philosophical significance of this proposition is that it reinforces the the-
sis according to which static games are games that allow us to make full
abstraction from speed. Its technical importance is related to the fact that the
EPM-model is much more convenient when it comes to describing strategies
as we will have a chance to see in Part 2, and is a more direct and practical
formal counterpart of our intuitive notion of what could be called interactive
algorithm.
The two models act as natural complements to each other: we can meaningfully
talk about the (uniquely determined) play between a given HPM and a given
EPM, while this is impossible if both players are HPMs or both are EPMs.
This fact will be essentially exploited in our completeness proof for logic CL3,
where we describe an environment’s strategy as an EPM and show that no
HPM can win the given game against such an EPM.
Let us agree on the following notation and terminology:
• For a run Γ, ¬Γ denotes the result of reversing all labels in Γ, i.e. changing
each labmove ℘α to ¬℘α.
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• For a run Γ and a computation branch B of an HPM or EPM, we say that
B cospells Γ iff B spells ¬Γ.
Intuitively, when a given machineM plays as ⊥ (rather than ⊤), then the run
that is generated by a given computation branch B ofM is the run cospelled
(rather than spelled) by B, for the moves thatM makes get the label ⊥, and
the moves that its adversary makes get the label ⊤.
The following lemma will be used in our completeness proof for CL3. Its
second clause assumes some standard encoding for play machines and their
configurations.
Lemma 3.3 Let E be a fair EPM.
(a) For any HPM H and any valuation e, there are a uniquely defined e-
computation branch BE of E and a uniquely defined e-computation branch BH
of H — which we respectively call the (E , e,H)-branch and the (H, e, E)-
branch — such that the run spelled by BH is the run cospelled by BE .
(b) Suppose e0, e1, e2, . . . are valuations such that the function g defined by
g(c, i) = ec(vi) is effective. Then there is an effective function which takes (the
code of) an arbitrary HPM H and arbitrary nonnegative integers c, n, and
returns the (code of the) nth configuration of the (E , ec,H)-branch. Similarly
for the (H, ec, E)-branch.
When e, H, E , BH are as in clause (a) of the above lemma, we call the run Γ
spelled by BH the H vs E run on e; then, if A is a game with Wn
A
e 〈Γ〉 = ⊤
(resp. WnAe 〈Γ〉 = ⊥), we say that H wins (resp. loses) A against E on e.
A formal proof of Lemma 3.3 is given in [11] (Lemma 20.4), 3 and we will not
reproduce it here. Instead, the following intuitive explanation would suffice:
Assume E is a fair EPM, H is an arbitrary HPM and e an arbitrary valuation.
The play that we are going to describe is the unique play generated when the
two machines play against each other, with H in the role of ⊤, E in the role
of ⊥, and valuation e spelled on the valuation tapes of both machines. We
can visualize this play as follows. Most of the time during the play H remains
inactive (sleeping); it is woken up only when E enters a permission state, on
which event H makes a (one single) transition to its next computation step
— that may or may not result in making a move — and goes back to sleep
that will continue until E enters a permission state again, and so on. From
E ’s perspective, H acts as a patient adversary who makes one or zero move
3 Clause (b) of our lemma 3.3 is slightly stronger than the official formulation of
the corresponding clause (c) of Lemma 20.4 of [11]. However, the proof given in [11]
is just as good for our present strong formulation.
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only when granted permission, just as the EPM-model assumes. And from H’s
perspective, who, like a person under global anesthesia, has no sense of time
during its sleep and hence can think that the wake-up events that it calls the
beginning of a clock cycle happen at a constant rate, E acts as an adversary
who can make any finite number of moves during a clock cycle (i.e. whileH was
sleeping), just as the HPM-model assumes. This scenario uniquely determines
an e-computation branch BE of E that we call the (E , e,H)-branch, and an
e-computation branch BH of H that we call the (H, e, E)-branch. What we
call the H vs E run on e is the run generated in this play. In particular —
since we let H play in the role of ⊤ — this is the run spelled by BH. E , who
plays in the role of ⊥, sees the same run, only it sees the labels of that run
in negative colors. That is, BE cospells rather than spells that run. This is
exactly what clause (a) of Lemma 3.3 asserts. Now suppose e0, e1, e2, . . . and g
are as in clause (b), and e is one of the ec. Then, using g, the contents of any
initial segment of the valuation tape(s) can be effectively constructed from c.
Therefore the work of either machine can be effectively traced up to any given
computation step n, which implies clause (b).
4 Operations on computational problems
As noted, computability logic is an approach that uses logical formalism for
specifying and studying interactive computational problems in a systematic
way, understanding logical operators as operations on games/problems. It is
time to define basic operations on games. It should be noted that even though
our interests are focused on static games, the operations defined in this section
are equally meaningful for non-static (dynamic) games as well. So, we do not
restrict the scope of those definitions to static games, and throughout the
section we let the letters A,B range over any games. Here comes the first
definition:
Definition 4.1 Let A be any game, x1, . . . , xn (n ≥ 0) pairwise distinct
variables, and t1, . . . , tn any terms. For any valuation e, let e
◦ denote the
unique valuation that agrees with e on all variables that are not among
x1, . . . , xn, such that, for each xi ∈ {x1, . . . , xn}, e◦(xi) = e(ti). Then we
define the game A[x1/t1, . . . , xn/tn] by stipulating that, for any valuation
e, LrA[x1/t1,...,xn/tn]e = Lr
A
e◦ and Wn
A[x1/t1,...,xn/tn]
e = Wn
A
e◦ ; in other words,
e[A[x1/t1, . . . , xn/tn]] = e
◦[A].
This operation, that we call substitution of variables, is a generalization
of the standard operation of substitution of variables known from classical
predicate logic. Intuitively, A[x1/t1, . . . , xn/tn] is the same as A, only with (the
values of) variables x1, . . . , xn “read as” (the values of) t1, . . . , tn, respectively.
Each ti here can be either a variable or a constant. Remember from Section 2
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that when ti is a constant, e(ti) = ti.
Example: If A is the elementary game x × y > z + u, then A[x/z, z/6, u/y]
would be the game z × y > 6 + y.
Sometimes it is convenient to fix a certain tuple (x1, . . . , xn) of pairwise dis-
tinct variables for a game A throughout a context and write A in the form
A(x1, . . . , xn). We will refer to such a tuple (x1, . . . , xn) as the attached tu-
ple of (the given representation of) A. When doing so, we do not necessarily
mean that A(x1, . . . , xn) is an n-ary game and/or that x1, . . . , xn are exactly
the variables on which this game depends. Once A is given with an attached
tuple (x1, . . . , xn), we will write A(t1, . . . , tn) to mean the same as the more
clumsy expression A[x1/t1, . . . , xn/tn]. A similar notational practice is com-
mon in the literature for predicates. Thus, the above game x × y > z + u
can be written as A(x, z, u), in which case A(z, 6, y) will denote the game
z × y > 6 + y.
We have already seen two meanings of symbol ¬: one was that of an operation
on players (Section 2), and one that of an operation on runs (Section 3). Here
comes the third meaning of it — that of an operation on games:
Definition 4.2 The negation ¬A of a game A is defined by:
• Lr¬Ae = {Γ | ¬Γ ∈ Lr
A
e }.
• Wn¬Ae 〈Γ〉 = ¬Wn
A
e 〈¬Γ〉.
Intuitively, ¬A is game A with the roles of the two players switched: ⊤’s moves
or wins become ⊥’s moves or wins, and vice versa. For example, if Chess is the
game of chess from the point of view of the white player, then ¬Chess would
be the same game from the point of view of the black player.
The operations ∧ and ∨ produce parallel combinations of games. Playing
A1 ∧ . . . ∧An or A1 ∨ . . . ∨An means playing the n games concurrently. Both
A1∧ . . .∧An and A1∨ . . .∨An have exactly the same structure (legal moves),
and the only difference is in how the winner is determined: in order to win,
in the former ⊤ needs to win in each of the n components, while in the latter
winning in one of the components is sufficient. To indicate that a given move
is made in the ith component, the player should prefix it with the string “i.”.
Any move that does not have one of such prefixes will be considered illegal.
Here comes the formal definition. In it the notation Γγ means the result of
removing from Γ all labeled moves except those of the form ℘γα (℘ ∈ {⊤,⊥}),
and then deleting the prefix “γ” in the remaining moves, i.e. changing each
such ℘γα to ℘α.
Definition 4.3 Let A1, . . . , An (n ≥ 2) be any games.
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The parallel conjunction A1 ∧ . . . ∧An of A1, . . . , An is defined by:
• Γ ∈ LrA1∧...∧Ane iff every move of Γ has one of the prefixes “1.”, . . . , “n.”
and, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Γi. ∈ LrAie .
• Whenever Γ ∈ LrA1∧...∧Ane , Wn
A1∧...∧An
e 〈Γ〉 = ⊤ iff, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
WnAie 〈Γ
i.〉 = ⊤.
The parallel disjunction A1 ∨ . . . ∨ An of A1, . . . , An is defined in exactly
the same way, only with “⊤” replaced by “⊥”. Equivalently, it can be defined
by A1 ∨ . . . ∨ An =def ¬(¬A1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬An).
The other operation from the same group — the parallel implication A→ B
of games A and B — is defined by A→ B =def (¬A) ∨ B.
Intuitively, A → B is the problem of reducing B (consequent) to A (an-
tecedent). That is, solving A → B means solving B having A as a com-
putational resource. Generally, computational resources are symmetric to
computational tasks/problems: what is a problem for one player to solve, is a
resource for the other player to use, and vice versa. Since in the antecedent of
A → B the roles of the players are switched, A becomes a problem for ⊥ to
solve, and hence a resource that ⊤ can use. Thus, our semantics of computa-
tional problems is, at the same time, a semantics of computational resources.
As noted before, this offers a materialization of the abstract resource philos-
ophy associated with linear logic [4]. We will see a couple of examples later
supporting this claim. More elaborated examples and discussions can be found
in [11], where, in Section 26, the context of computational resources is further
extended to informational and physical resources as well. [13] also abounds
with illustrative examples.
On an intuitive level, our parallel operations can be related to the corre-
sponding multiplicative operators of linear logic. The game-semantical ap-
proach to linear-logic-style connectives is not new in principle, even if it has
rather stubbornly resisted a complete treatment within natural frameworks.
What makes our understanding of “multiplicatives” substantially different
from other ([1,3,6] etc.) interpretations is that they are free, i.e. generate free
games, even when applied to strict games. As an example, consider the game
Chess∧Chess. Assume an agent plays this two-board game over the Internet
against two independent adversaries — adversary #1 on board #1 and adver-
sary #2 on board #2 — that, together, form the (one) environment for the
agent. As we agreed, Chess is the game playing which means playing the game
of chess white. Hence, in the initial position of Chess ∧ Chess, only the agent
has legal moves. But once such a move is made, say, on board #1, the picture
changes. Now both the agent and the environment have legal moves: the agent
may make another opening move on board #2, while the environment — in
particular adversary #1 — may make a reply move on board #1. This is a sit-
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uation where which player ‘is to move’ is no longer strictly determined, so the
next player to move will be the one who can or wants to act faster. A strict-
game approach would impose some additional conditions uniquely determining
the next player to move. Such conditions would most likely be artificial and
not quite adequate, for the situation we are trying to model is a concurrent
play on two boards against two independent adversaries, and we cannot or
should not expect any coordination between their actions. Most of the com-
pound tasks we perform in everyday life are free rather than strict, and so are
most computer communication/interaction protocols. A strict understanding
of ∧ would essentially mean some sort of an (in a way interspersed but still)
sequential rather than truly parallel/concurrent combination of tasks, where
no steps in one component would be allowed to be made until receiving a
response in the other component, contrary to the very spirit of the idea of
parallel/distributed computation.
It is no accident that we use classical symbols for the above operations. As
this is easy to see, the meanings of these operations, as well as the meanings
of the so called blind quantifiers ∀,∃ that will be defined shortly, are exactly
classical when their scope is restricted to elementary games (in which case
the compound games generated by these operations also remain elementary).
This is what makes classical logic just a special fragment of the more general
and expressive computability logic. Once the scope of the “classical” propo-
sitional connectives is extended beyond elementary games, however, their be-
havior starts resembling that of the multiplicative operators of linear logic.
E.g. the principle A → A ∧ A generally fails for nonelementary games. Yet,
this resemblance is rather shallow, and typically disappears as soon as we start
considering longer and “deeper” formulas. See [11] for more about how com-
putability logic relates to linear logic. We do not want to go into details of this
discussion here because, as pointed out in Section 1, this work is everything
but an attempt to find a justification for linear logic — the popular logic that
is syntactically so appealing yet lacks a convincing semantics.
The next group of operations: ⊓, ⊔, ⊓ and ⊔ that we call choice operations,
on the other hand, bear resemblance with the additive operators of linear logic.
Based on their semantics, in more traditional terms they can be characterized
as constructive versions of conjunction, disjunction, universal quantifier and
existential quantifier, respectively.
⊓xA(x) is the game where, in the initial position, only ⊥ has legal moves.
Such a move consists in a choice of one of the elements of the universe of
discourse. After ⊥ makes a move c ∈ {0, 1, . . .}, the game continues (and the
winner is determined) according to the rules of A(c). If no initial move is made,
⊤ is considered the winner as there was no particular (sub)problem specified
by ⊥ that ⊤ failed to solve. A⊓B is similar, only here the choice is just made
between “left” (“1”) and “right” (“2”). ⊔ and ⊔ are symmetric to ⊓ and ⊓,
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with the only difference that now it is ⊤ rather than ⊥ who makes an initial
move/choice. Here is the formal definition:
Definition 4.4 Let A(x), A1, . . . , An (n ≥ 2) be any games.
The choice conjunction A1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ An of A1, . . . , An is defined by:
• LrA1⊓...⊓Ane = {〈〉} ∪ {〈⊥i,∆〉 | i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ∆ ∈ Lr
Ai
e }.
• WnA1⊓...⊓Ane 〈Γ〉 = ⊥ iff Γ = 〈⊥i,∆〉, where i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and Wn
Ai
e 〈∆〉 =
⊥.
The choice disjunction A1 ⊔ . . .⊔An of A1, . . . , An is defined in exactly the
same way, only with “⊤” instead of “⊥”. Equivalently, it can be defined by
A1 ⊔ . . . ⊔An =def ¬(¬A1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ ¬An).
The choice universal quantification ⊓xA(x) of A(x) is defined by:
• Lr⊓xA(x)e = {〈〉} ∪ {〈⊥c,∆〉 | c is a constant, ∆ ∈ Lr
A(c)
e }.
• Wn⊓xA(x)e 〈Γ〉 = ⊥ iff Γ = 〈⊥c,∆〉, where c is a constant and Wn
A(c)
e 〈∆〉 =
⊥.
The choice existential quantification⊔xA(x) of A(x) is defined in exactly
the same way, only with “⊤” instead of “⊥”. Equivalently, it can be defined
by ⊔xA(x) =def ¬⊓x¬A(x).
A few examples would help. The problem of computing a function f can be
specified as ⊓x⊔y(f(x) = y). This is a game of depth 2, where the first
legal move — selecting a particular value k for x — is by ⊥. Making such a
move brings the game down to ⊔y(f(k) = y). The second move — selecting
a value n for y — is by ⊤, after which the game continues (or rather stops)
as f(k) = n. The latter is an elementary game won by ⊤ iff f(k) really equals
n. Obviously f is computable in the standard sense iff ⊓x⊔y(f(x) = y) is
winnable, i.e. computable in our sense.
Next, the problem of deciding a predicate p(x) would be specified as⊓x(p(x)⊔
¬p(x)). This is the game where, after ⊥ selects a value k for x, the machine
should reply by one of the moves 1 or 2; the game will be considered won by
the machine if p(k) is true and the move 1 was made, or p(k) is false and the
choice was 2, so that decidability of p(x) means nothing but existence of a
machine that wins the game ⊓x(p(x) ⊔ ¬p(x)).
To get a feel of→ as a problem reduction operation, let us consider reduction
of the acceptance problem to the halting problem (the example borrowed
from [11]). The halting problem can be expressed by ⊓x⊓y(Halts(x, y) ⊔
¬Halts(x, y)), where Halts(x, y) is the predicate “Turing machine x halts on
input y”. Similarly, the acceptance problem can be expressed by the formula
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⊓x⊓y(Accepts(x, y) ⊔ ¬Accepts(x, y)), where Accepts(x, y) is the predicate
“Turing machine x accepts input y”. While the acceptance problem is not
decidable, it is algorithmically reducible to the halting problem. In particular,
there is an HPM that wins
⊓x⊓y(Halts(x, y) ⊔ ¬Halts(x, y))→⊓x⊓y(Accepts(x, y) ⊔ ¬Accepts(x, y)).
Here is a strategy for solving this problem: Wait till the environment selects
values k and n for x and y in the consequent (if such a selection is never
made, the machine wins). Then specify the same values k and n for x and y
in the antecedent (where the roles of the machine and the environment are
switched), and see whether ⊥ responds by 1 or 2 there. If the response is 1,
simulate machine k on input n until it halts, and select, in the consequent,
1 or 2 depending on whether the simulation accepted or rejected. And if ⊥’s
response in the antecedent was 2, then select 2 in the consequent.
We can see that what the machine did in the above strategy indeed was a
reduction: it used an (external) solution to the halting problem to solve the
acceptance problem. There are various natural concepts of reduction, and the
sort of reduction captured by→, that we call linear reduction, is most basic
among them.
One of the other, well-established, concepts of reduction is mapping reduc-
tion: A predicate p(x) is said to be mapping reducible to a predicate q(x) iff
there is an effective function f such that, for any constant c, p(c) is true iff
q(f(c)) is true. Using A ↔ B as an abbreviation for (A → B) ∧ (B → A),
it is not hard to see that mapping reducibility of p(x) to q(x) means nothing
but winnability of the game ⊓x⊔y(p(x) ↔ q(y)).
Notice that while standard approaches only allow us to talk about (a what-
ever sort of) reducibility as a relation between problems, in our approach
reduction becomes an operation on problems, with reducibility as a rela-
tion simply meaning computability of the corresponding combination (such
as ⊓x⊔y(p(x) ↔ q(y)) or A→ B) of problems. Similarly for other relations
or properties such as the property of decidability. The latter becomes the op-
eration of deciding if we define the problem of deciding a predicate (or any
computational problem) p(x) as the game ⊓x(p(x) ⊔ ¬p(x)). So, now we can
meaningfully ask questions such as “Is the linear reduction of the problem of
deciding p(x) to the problem of deciding q(x) linearly reducible to the mapping
reduction of p(x) to q(x)?”. This question would be equivalent to whether the
following problem is (always) computable:
⊓x⊔y(p(x) ↔ q(y))→
(
⊓x(q(x) ⊔ ¬q(x))→⊓x(p(x) ⊔ ¬p(x))
)
. (1)
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This problem is indeed computable no matter what particular predicates p(x)
and q(x) are, which means that mapping reduction is at least as strong as
linear reduction. Here is a strategy: Wait till ⊥ selects a value k for x in the
consequent of the consequent of (1). Then specify the same value k for x in
the antecedent of (1), and wait till ⊥ replies there by selecting a value n for
y. Then select the same value n for x in the antecedent of the consequent of
(1). ⊥ will have to respond by 1 or 2 in that component of the game. Repeat
that very response in the consequent of the consequent of (1), and celebrate
victory.
Expression (1) is a legal formula of the language of CL3 which, according to
our main Theorem 5.9, is sound and complete with respect to computability
semantics. So, had our ad hoc methods failed to find an answer (and this
would certainly be the case if we dealt with a more complex problem), the
existence of a successful algorithmic strategy could have been established by
showing that (1) is provable in CL3. Moreover, by clause (a) of Theorem 5.9,
after finding an CL3-proof of (1), we would not only know that an algorithmic
solution to (1) exists, but we would also be able to constructively obtain such
a solution from the proof. On the other hand, the fact that linear reduction
is not as strong as mapping reduction could be established by showing that
CL3 does not prove
(
⊓x(q(x) ⊔ ¬q(x))→⊓x(p(x) ⊔ ¬p(x))
)
→⊓x⊔y(p(x) ↔ q(y)). (2)
This negative fact, too, can be established effectively as, according to Theorem
5.7, the relevant fragment of CL3 is decidable. Our proof of the completeness
part of Theorem 5.9 would then offer a way how to construct particular pred-
icates p(x) and q(x) for which (2) is not computable.
These few examples must be sufficient to provide insights into the utility of
computability logic and CL3 in particular for theory of computing: our logic
offers a convenient tool for asking and answering questions in the above style
(and beyond) in a systematic way, something that so far has been mostly done
in an ad hoc manner or has been simply impossible to do. By iterating avail-
able operators, we can express and explore an infinite variety computational
problems and relations between them, only few of which may have special
names established in the literature.
The next, already mentioned group of operations is what we call “blind quan-
tifiers”: ∀ and ∃, with hardly any reasonably close counterparts in linear logic.
For certain reasons, the operations ∀x and ∃x we only define for games called
x-unistructural. A game A is said to be x-unistructural (or unistructural
in x) iff, for any two valuations e1 and e2 that agree on all variables except per-
haps x, we have LrAe1 = Lr
A
e2
. Intuitively, this is a game whose structure does
not depend on x. In fact whether we impose the x-unistructurality condition
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or not is irrelevant in our present case because this condition is automatically
satisfied anyway: as shown in [11], all games that can be expressed in the
language of CL3 are unistructural, and obviously all unistructural games are
also x-unistructural.
Definition 4.5 Let x be any variable and A(x) any x-unistructural game.
The blind universal quantification ∀xA(x) of A(x) is defined by:
• Lr∀xA(x)e = Lr
A(x)
e .
• Wn∀xA(x)e 〈Γ〉 = ⊤ iff, for every constant c, Wn
A(c)
e 〈Γ〉 = ⊤.
The blind existential quantification ∃xA(x) of A(x) is defined in exactly
the same way, only with “⊥” instead of “⊤”. Equivalently, it can be defined
by ∃xA(x) =def ¬∀x¬A(x).
The meaning of ∀xA(x) is similar to that of⊓xA(x), with the difference that
⊥ does not make a move specifying a particular value of x, so that ⊤ has
to play blindly in a way that would be successful for any possible value of
x. Alternatively, ∀xA(x) can be thought of as the version of ⊓xA(x) where
the particular value of x selected by ⊥ remains invisible to ⊤. This way,
∀ and ∃ produce games with imperfect information. Compare the problems
⊓x(Even(x) ⊔Odd(x)) and ∀x(Even(x) ⊔Odd(x)). The former is an easy-to-
compute problem of depth 2, while the latter is an incomputable problem of
depth 1 with only by the machine to make a move — select the true disjunct,
which is hardly possible to do as the value of x remains unspecified. Some
problems that depend on x can be however solved having only partial infor-
mation on x. For example, in order to tell whether x is even or odd, we do
not really need to read the whole (decimal representation of) x — it would
be sufficient to look at its last digit, i.e. know the value of (xMod 10). Thus,
the problem ∀x
(
⊔y(y = (xMod 10))→ (Even(x)⊔Odd(x))
)
is computable,
which is a more informative statement than if we had stated computability of
the same problem with ⊓ instead of ∀. As noted a while ago, the meanings
of ∀ and ∃ are exactly classical when applied to elementary games, which
explains why we use the classical notation for them.
Another important group of operations comprises recurrence operations.
They come in different flavors (see [13]), perhaps the most interesting of which
is what is called branching recurrence 4 ◦| . Intuitively ◦|A, as a resource,
is A that can be reused an arbitrary number of times. The same is true for
the other sorts of recurrences, but there are several natural understandings
of reusage, with ◦| corresponding to the strongest form of it and the other
recurrence operations corresponding to weaker concepts of reusage/recycling
(and it is not clear which of the recurrence operations best corresponds to what
4 In [11] this operation is called branching conjunction and is denoted by !.
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the exponential operator ! of linear logic was meant to capture). The operation
◦– , called weak reduction, 5 is defined by A ◦–B = ◦|A→ B. This operation
formalizes our weakest possible intuitive concept of reduction. The difference
between → and ◦– as reduction operations is that while in the former every
act of resource (antecedent) consumption is strictly accounted for, the latter
allows uncontrolled usage of resources. One of the conjectures stated in [11] is
that we get exactly intuitionistic calculus when the intuitionistic implication
is understood as ◦– and the other intuitionistic operators understood as the
corresponding choice operations. Recurrence operators and weak reduction
are not in the logical vocabulary of CL3, and hence we do not give formal
definitions for them. Such definitions can be found in [11] and [13].
According to Theorem 14.1 of [11], all of the operations that we discussed in
this section preserve the static and unistructural properties of games. Tak-
ing into account that predicates as elementary games are static (Proposition
2.3) and obviously unistructural, their closure under those operations forms a
natural class of unistructural computational problems. All of those operations
except ◦| and ◦– also preserve the finite-depth property. Hence the closure
of the set of all elementary problems under substitution of variables, ¬, ∧, ∨,
→, ∀, ∃, ⊓, ⊔, ⊓ and ⊔ forms a natural class of finite-depth, unistructural
computational problems. As we are going to see, this is exactly the class of
problems expressible in the language of CL3. Finally, as already noted more
than once, the operations ¬, ∧, ∨, →, ∀, ∃ preserve the elementary property
of games: they send predicates to predicates; and, when restricted to predi-
cates, they coincide with the same-name classical operations. Of course, the
same applies to the operation of substitution of variables, as well as the trivial
games ⊥ and ⊤ that can be understood as 0-ary operations on games.
One more game operation that we are going to look at is that of prefixation,
which is somewhat reminiscent of the modal operator(s) of dynamic logic.
This operation takes two arguments: a game A and a position Φ that must be
what we call a unilegal position of A (otherwise the operation is undefined).
Γ is said to be a unilegal run (position if finite) of a game A iff, for every
valuation e, Γ ∈ LrAe . As noted above, all games that we deal with in this
paper are unistructural, and for such games obviously there is no difference
between “unilegal” and “legal”.
Definition 4.6 Assume Φ is a unilegal position of a gameA. The Φ-prefixation
of A, denoted 〈Φ〉A, is defined as follows:
• Lr〈Φ〉Ae = {Γ | 〈Φ,Γ〉 ∈ Lr
A
e }.
• Wn〈Φ〉Ae 〈Γ〉 =Wn
A
e 〈Φ,Γ〉.
5 [11] uses the symbol ⇒ for this operation.
22
Intuitively, 〈Φ〉A is the game playing which means playing A starting (con-
tinuing) from position Φ. That is, 〈Φ〉A is the game to which A evolves (is
“brought down”) after the (lab)moves of Φ have been made. We have already
used this intuition when explaining the meaning of the choice operations. E.g.,
we said that after ⊥ makes an initial move c, the game ⊓xA(x) continues as
A(c). What this meant was nothing but that 〈⊥c〉(⊓xA(x)) = A(c). The
following proposition summarizes this sort of a characterization of the choice
operations, and extends it to the other operations, too. It tells us what the
legal initial moves for a given game are, and to what game that game evolves
after such a (uni)legal move is made.
Proposition 4.7 In each of the following clauses, e is any valuation, ℘ either
player, and α, β any moves; in each subclause (b), the game on the left of the
equation is assumed to be defined, i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and c ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}.
(1) (a) 〈℘α〉 ∈ Lr¬Ae iff 〈¬℘α〉 ∈ Lr
A
e ;
(b) 〈℘α〉¬A = ¬(〈¬℘α〉A).
(2) (a) 〈℘α〉 ∈ LrA1∧...∧Ane iff α = i.β, where i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and 〈℘β〉 ∈ Lr
Ai
e ;
(b) 〈℘i.β〉(A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An) = A1 ∧ . . . ∧Ai−1 ∧ 〈℘β〉Ai ∧ Ai+1 ∧ . . . ∧An.
(3) (a) 〈℘α〉 ∈ LrA1∨...∨Ane iff α = i.β, where i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and 〈℘β〉 ∈ Lr
Ai
e ;
(b) 〈℘i.β〉(A1 ∨ . . . ∨ An) = A1 ∨ . . . ∨Ai−1 ∨ 〈℘β〉Ai ∨ Ai+1 ∨ . . . ∨An.
(4) (a) 〈℘α〉 ∈ LrA→Be iff α = i.β, where


i = 1 and 〈¬℘β〉 ∈ LrAe , or
i = 2 and 〈℘β〉 ∈ LrBe ;
(b)


〈℘1.β〉(A→ B) = 〈¬℘β〉A→ B;
〈℘2.β〉(A→ B) = A→ 〈℘β〉B.
(5) (a) 〈℘α〉 ∈ LrA1⊓...⊓Ane iff ℘ = ⊥ and α = i ∈ {1, . . . , n};
(b) 〈⊥i〉(A1 ⊓ . . . ⊓An) = Ai.
(6) (a) 〈℘α〉 ∈ LrA1⊔...⊔Ane iff ℘ = ⊤ and α = i ∈ {1, . . . , n};
(b) 〈⊤i〉(A1 ⊔ . . . ⊔An) = Ai.
(7) (a) 〈℘α〉 ∈ Lr⊓xA(x)e iff ℘ = ⊥ and α = c ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .};
(b) 〈⊥c〉⊓xA(x) = A(c).
(8) (a) 〈℘α〉 ∈ Lr⊔xA(x)e iff ℘ = ⊤ and α = c ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .};
(b) 〈⊤c〉⊔xA(x) = A(c).
(9) (a) 〈℘α〉 ∈ Lr∀xA(x)e iff 〈℘α〉 ∈ Lr
A(x)
e ;
(b) 〈℘α〉∀xA(x) = ∀x〈℘α〉A(x).
(10) (a) 〈℘α〉 ∈ Lr∃xA(x)e iff 〈℘α〉 ∈ Lr
A(x)
e ;
(b) 〈℘α〉∃xA(x) = ∃x〈℘α〉A(x).
The above fact is known from [11]. Its proof consists in just a routine analysis
of the relevant definitions.
Just like this is the case with recurrence operations, the language of CL3 does
not have any constructs corresponding to prefixation. However, this operation
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will be heavily exploited in our soundness and completeness proof for CL3
in Part 2. Generally, prefixation is very handy in visualizing a (unilegal) run
of a given game A. In particular, every (sub)position Φ of such a run can be
represented by, or thought of as, the game 〈Φ〉A.
Here is an example. Remember game (1). Based on Proposition 4.7, the run
〈⊥2.2.7,⊤1.7,⊥1.9,⊤2.1.9,⊥2.1.1,⊤2.2.1〉 is a (uni)legal run of that game,
and to it corresponds the following sequence of games:
(i)
(
⊓x⊔y(p(x) ↔ q(y))
)
→
(
⊓x(q(x) ⊔ ¬q(x))→⊓x(p(x) ⊔ ¬p(x))
)
,
i.e. 〈〉(1);
(ii)
(
⊓x⊔y(p(x) ↔ q(y))
)
→
(
⊓x(q(x) ⊔ ¬q(x))→(P (7) ⊔ ¬p(7))
)
,
i.e. 〈⊥2.2.7〉(i), i.e. 〈⊥2.2.7〉(1);
(iii)
(
⊔y(p(7) ↔ q(y))
)
→
(
⊓x(q(x) ⊔ ¬q(x))→(p(7) ⊔ ¬p(7))
)
,
i.e. 〈⊤1.7〉(ii), i.e. 〈⊥2.2.7,⊤1.7〉(1);
(iv)
(
p(7) ↔ q(9)
)
→
(
⊓x(q(x) ⊔ ¬q(x))→(p(7) ⊔ ¬p(7))
)
,
i.e. 〈⊥1.9〉(iii), i.e. 〈⊥2.2.7,⊤1.7,⊥1.9〉(1);
(v)
(
p(7) ↔ q(9)
)
→
(
(q(9) ⊔ ¬q(9))→(p(7) ⊔ ¬p(7))
)
,
i.e. 〈⊤2.1.9〉(iv), i.e. 〈⊥2.2.7,⊤1.7,⊥1.9,⊤2.1.9〉(1);
(vi)
(
p(7) ↔ q(9)
)
→
(
q(9)→(p(7) ⊔ ¬p(7))
)
,
i.e. 〈⊥2.1.1〉(v), i.e. 〈⊥2.2.7,⊤1.7,⊥1.9,⊤2.1.9,⊥2.1.1〉(1);
(vii)
(
p(7) ↔ q(9)
)
→
(
q(9)→ p(7)
)
,
i.e. 〈⊤2.2.1〉(vi), i.e. 〈⊥2.2.7,⊤1.7,⊥1.9,⊤2.1.9,⊥2.1.1,⊤2.2.1〉(1).
Player ⊤ is the winner because the run hits a true elementary game. In this
run ⊤ has followed the winning strategy that we described for (1) earlier.
We finish this section by reproducing a fact proven in [11] (Proposition 21.3),
according to which modus ponens preserves computability, and does so in a
constructive sense:
Proposition 4.8 For any computational problems A and B, if |= A and
|= A→ B, then |= B. Moreover, there is an effective procedure that converts
any two HPMs H1 and H2 into an HPM H3 such that, for any computational
problems A, B and any valuation e, whenever H1 |=e A and H2 |=e A → B,
we have H3 |=e B.
A similar closure property was proven in Section 21 of [11] with respect to the
rules A 7→ ⊓xA and A 7→ ◦|A, with P 7→ C here and later meaning “from
premise(s) P conclude C”.
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5 Logic CL3
By the classical language we mean the language of pure classical first-order
logic with individual constants but without equality and functional symbols.
We assume that the set of terms — i.e. variables and constants — of
this language is the same as the one we fixed in Section 2. As always, each
predicate letter comes with a fixed arity. An (n-ary non-logical) atom is
the expression p(t1, . . . , tn), where p is an n-ary predicate letter and the ti are
terms.
The language of CL3 extends the classical language by adding the operators
⊓,⊔,⊓,⊔ to its vocabulary. The names that we use for the logical operators
of the language are the same as for the (same-symbolic-name) game operations
defined in the previous section. Throughout the rest of this paper by a formula
we mean a formula of this language. The definition is standard — the set of
formulas is the smallest set of expressions such that:
• Non-logical atoms and the logical atoms ⊤ and ⊥ are formulas;
• If F1, . . . , Fn (n ≥ 2) are formulas, then so are ¬F1, F1∧. . .∧Fn, F1∨. . .∨Fn,
F1 → F2, F1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Fn, F1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Fn;
• If F is a formula and x is a variable, then ∀xF , ∃xF , ⊓xF , ⊔xF are
formulas.
The definitions of what a free or bound occurrence of a variable means are
also standard, keeping in mind that now a variable can be bound by any of
the four quantifiers ∀,∃,⊓,⊔. Every occurrence of a constant also counts
as free. By a free variable of a formula F we mean a variable that has free
occurrences in F . Similarly, the free terms of F are its free variables plus the
constants occurring in F . As known, classical validity of a formula of the
classical language that contains constants means the same as validity of the
same formula with its constants understood as free variables. So, for a reader
more used to the version of classical logic where variables are the only terms,
it is perfectly safe to think of constants as free variables.
In the previous section, substitution of variables was defined as an operation
on games. Here we define a “similar” operation on formulas called substitu-
tion of terms. Suppose F is a formula, t1, . . . , tn are pairwise distinct terms,
and t′1, . . . , t
′
n are any terms. Then F [t1/t
′
1, . . . , tn/t
′
n] stands for the result of
simultaneously substituting in F all free occurrences of t1, . . . , tn by t
′
1, . . . , t
′
n,
respectively.
In concordance with a similar notational practice established in Section 4
for games, sometimes we represent a formula F as F (t1, . . . , tn) where the ti
are pairwise distinct terms. In the context defined by such a representation,
F (t′1, . . . , t
′
n) will mean the same as F [t1/t
′
1, . . . , tn/t
′
n]. Our disambiguating
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convention is that the context is set by the expression that was used earlier.
That is, when we first mention F (t1, . . . , tn) and only after that use the ex-
pression F (t′1, . . . , t
′
n), the latter should be understood as F [t1/t
′
1, . . . , tn/t
′
n]
rather than the former understood as F [t′1/t1, . . . , t
′
n/tn]. It should be noted
that, when representing F as F (t1, . . . , tn), we do not necessarily mean that
t1, . . . , tn are exactly the free terms of F .
An interpretation is a function ∗ that sends each n-ary predicate letter p to
an elementary game p∗ = A(x1, . . . , xn) with an attached n-tuple of (pairwise
distinct) variables. This assignment extends to formulas by commuting with
all operations. That is: Where p and A(x1, . . . , xn) are as above and t1, . . . , tn
are any terms, (p(t1, . . . , tn))
∗ = A(t1, . . . , tn); ⊥∗ = ⊥; (¬F )∗ = ¬(F ∗);
(F1⊓ . . .⊓Fk)
∗ = F ∗1 ⊓ . . .⊓F
∗
k ; (∀xF )∗ = ∀x(F ∗); etc. For a predicate letter
p, we will say “ ∗ interprets p as A” to mean that p∗ = A. Similarly, for a
formula F , if F ∗ = A, we say that ∗ interprets F as A.
For a formula F , an interpretation ∗ is said to be F -admissible iff, for any
n-ary predicate letter p, the game A(x1, . . . , xn) assigned to p by
∗ does not
depend on any variables that are not among x1, . . . , xn but occur in F . We
need this condition to avoid possible collisions of variables.
Definition 5.1 A formula F is said to be valid iff |= F ∗ for every F -admissible
interpretation ∗.
To axiomatize the set of valid formulas, we need some technical preliminaries.
Understanding F → G as an abbreviation for ¬F ∨ G, a positive (resp.
negative) occurrence of a subformula is one that is in the scope of an
even (resp. odd) number of occurrences of ¬. A surface occurrence of a
subformula is an occurrence that is not in the scope of any choice operators.
A formula not containing choice operators — i.e. a formula of the classical
language — is said to be elementary. The elementarization of a formula
F is the result of replacing in F all surface occurrences of subformulas of the
form G1 ⊔ . . . ⊔Gn or ⊔xG by ⊥ and all surface occurrences of subformulas
of the form G1 ⊓ . . .⊓Gn or ⊓xG by ⊤. A formula is said to be stable iff its
elementarization is classically valid. Otherwise it is instable.
Definition 5.2 Logic CL3 is given by the following rules:
A. ~H 7→ F , where F is stable and ~H is a set of formulas satisfying the
following conditions:
(i) Whenever F has a positive (resp. negative) surface occurrence of a sub-
formula G1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Gn (resp. G1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Gn), for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ~H
contains the result of replacing that occurrence in F by Gi;
(ii) Whenever F has a positive (resp. negative) surface occurrence of a
subformula ⊓xG(x) (resp. ⊔xG(x)), ~H contains the result of replacing
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that occurrence in F by G(y) for some variable y not occurring in F .
B1. F ′ 7→ F , where F ′ is the result of replacing in F a negative (resp.
positive) surface occurrence of a subformula G1⊓. . .⊓Gn (resp. G1⊔. . .⊔Gn)
by Gi for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
B2. F ′ 7→ F , where F ′ is the result of replacing in F a negative (resp.
positive) surface occurrence of a subformula ⊓xG(x) (resp. ⊔xG(x)) by
G(t) for some term t such that (if t is a variable) neither the above occurrence
of ⊓xG(x) (resp. ⊔xG(x)) in F nor any of the free occurrences of x in G
are in the scope of ∀t, ∃t, ⊓t or ⊔t.
Axioms are not explicitly stated, but note that the set ~H of premises of Rule
A can be empty, in which case the conclusion F of that rule acts as an axiom.
Even though this may not be immediately obvious, CL3 essentially is a (re-
fined sort of) Gentzen-style system. Consider, for example, Rule B1. It is very
similar to the additive-disjunction-introduction rule of linear logic. The only
difference is that while linear logic requires that Gi be a ∨- (multiplicative)
disjunct of the premise, CL3 allows it to be any positive surface occurrence.
This is what the calculus of structures [5] calls deep inference, as opposed to
the shallow inference of linear logic. Natural semantics appear to naturally call
for this sort of inference. Yet the traditional Gentzen-style axiomatizations for
classical logic do not use it. To the question “why only shallow inference?”
classical logic has a simple answer: “because it is sufficient” (for Go¨del’s com-
pleteness). Linear logic, however, may not have a very good answer to this or
similar questions.
In the following examples and exercise, p and q are unary predicate letters.
Example 5.3 The following is a CL3-proof of ⊓x⊔y(p(x) ∨ ¬p(y)):
1. p(z) ∨ ¬p(z) (from {} by Rule A);
2. ⊔y(p(z) ∨ ¬p(y)) (from 1 by Rule B2);
3. ⊓x⊔y(p(x) ∨ ¬p(y)) (from {2} by Rule A).
Example 5.4 While ∃y∀x(p(x)∨¬p(y)) is a classically valid elementary for-
mula and hence derivable in CL3 by Rule A from the empty set of premises,
CL3 does not prove its “constructive version” ⊔y⊓x(p(x) ∨ ¬p(y)). Indeed,
the latter is instable, so it could only be derived by Rule B2 from the premise
⊓x(p(x) ∨ ¬p(t)) for some term t different from x. Rules B1 or B2 are not
applicable to ⊓x(p(x)∨¬p(t)), so this formula could only be derived by Rule
A. Then its (single) premise should be p(z) ∨ ¬p(t) for some variable z dif-
ferent from t. But p(z) ∨ ¬p(t) is now an instable formula not containing any
choice operators, so it cannot be derived by any of the rules of CL3.
Exercise 5.5 With Logic ⊢ F (resp. Logic 6⊢ F ) here and later meaning “F
is provable (resp. not provable) in Logic”, verify that:
1. CL3 ⊢ ∀x p(x) → ⊓x p(x);
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2. CL3 6⊢⊓x p(x) → ∀x p(x);
3. CL3 proves formula (1) from Section 4;
4. CL3 does not prove formula (2) from Section 4.
From the definition of CL3 it is clear that if F is an elementary formula, then
the only way to prove F in CL3 is to derive it by Rule A from the empty
set of premises. In particular, this rule will be applicable when F is stable,
which for an elementary F means nothing but that F is classically valid. And
vice versa: every classically valid formula is an elementary formula derivable
in CL3 by Rule A from the empty set of premises. Thus we have:
Proposition 5.6 The ⊓,⊔,⊓,⊔-free fragment of CL3 is exactly classical
logic.
This is what we should have expected for, as noted in Section 4, when restricted
to elementary problems — and elementary formulas are exactly the ones that
represent such problems — the meanings of all non-choice operators of CL3
are exactly classical.
Another natural fragment of CL3 is the one obtained by forbidding the blind
operators in its language. This is still a first-order logic as it contains the
constructive quantifiers ⊓ and ⊔. So, the following theorem, that will be
proven later in Section 10, may come as a pleasant surprise:
Theorem 5.7 The ∀,∃-free fragment of CL3 is decidable.
Of course CL3 in its full language cannot be decidable as it contains classical
logic. However, taking into account that classical validity and hence stability
of a formula is recursively enumerable, the following fact can be immediately
seen from the way CL3 is defined:
Proposition 5.8 CL3 is recursively enumerable.
Here comes our main theorem, according to which CL3 precisely describes the
set of all valid principles of computability. This theorem is just a combination
of Propositions 8.1 and 9.3 proven in Part 2.
Theorem 5.9 CL3 ⊢ F iff F is valid (any formula F ). Furthermore:
a) There is an effective procedure that takes an CL3-proof of a formula F and
constructs an HPM that wins F ∗ for every F -admissible interpretation ∗.
b) If CL3 6⊢ F , then F ∗ is not computable for some F -admissible interpreta-
tion ∗ that interprets atoms as finitary predicates of arithmetical complexity 6
∆2.
6 See page 48 for an explanation of what “arithmetical complexity ∆2” means.
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CL3 is a fragment of the logic FD introduced in [11]. The language of FD
is more expressive 7 in that it has an additional sort of letters called general
letters. Unlike our predicate letters (called elementary letters in [11]) that can
only be interpreted as elementary games, general letters can be interpreted
as any computational problems. CL3 is obtained from FD by mechanically
deleting the last two Rules C and D. Those two rules introduce general let-
ters that are alien to the language we now consider. Once a general letter is
introduced, it never disappears in any later formulas of an FD-proof. Based
on this observation, a formula in our present sense is provable in FD iff it is
provable in CL3, so that FD is a conservative extension of CL3. It was con-
jectured in [11] (Conjecture 25.4) that FD is sound and complete with respect
to computability semantics. Our Theorem 5.9 signifies a successful verification
of that conjecture restricted to the general-letter-free fragment of FD. This
fragment is called elementary-base as it only has elementary letters, i.e.
all atoms of it represent elementary problems. The fragment of computability
logic that FD is conjectured to axiomatize, in turn, is called finite-depth as
all of its logical operators represent game operations that preserve the finite-
depth property of games. Hence the fragment of computability logic captured
by CL3 was called in [11] the finite-depth, elementary-base fragment.
The language of FD, in turn, is just a fragment of the bigger language intro-
duced in [11] for computability logic, called the universal language. The latter
is the extension of the former by adding the operators ◦| , ◦| (◦| = ¬◦|¬) and ◦–
to it. [13] further augments the official language of computability logic with
a few other natural operators. Along with the above-mentioned Conjecture
25.4 regarding the soundness and completeness of FD, there were two other
major conjectures stated in [11] regarding the universal language: Conjecture
24.4 and Conjecture 26.2. A positive verification of those two conjectures re-
stricted to the language of CL3 is also among the immediate consequences of
our Theorem 5.9.
When restricted to the language of CL3, Conjecture 24.4 of [11] sounds as
follows:
If a formula F is not valid, then F ∗ is not computable for some F -admissible
interpretation ∗ that interprets every atom as a finitary predicate. 8
The significance of this conjecture is related to the fact that showing non-
validity of a given formula by appealing to interpretations that interpret atoms
7 Ignoring the minor detail that constants were not allowed in FD.
8 The original formulation of Conjecture 24.4 imposes three more restrictions on the
problems through which atoms are interpreted: those problems can be chosen to also
be determined (see [11] for a definition), strict (in the sense that in every position
at most one of the players has legal moves) and unistructural. These conditions can
be omitted in our case as they are automatically satisfied for elementary games.
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as infinitary predicates generally would seriously weaken such a non-validity
statement. E.g., if game p∗ depends on infinitely many variables, then p∗⊔¬p∗
may be incomputable just due to the fact that the machine would never be
able to finish reading all the relevant information from the valuation tape
necessary to determine whether p∗ is true or false. On the other hand, once
we restrict our considerations only to interpretations that interpret atoms
as finitary predicates, the non-validity statement for p ⊔ ¬p is indeed highly
informative: the failure to solve p∗ ⊔ ¬p∗ in such a case signifies fundamental
limitations of algorithmic methods rather than just impossibility to obtain
all the necessary external information. A positive solution to Conjecture 24.4
of [11] restricted to the language of CL3 is contained in clause (b) of our
Theorem 5.9.
As for Conjecture 26.2, it was about equivalence between validity and another
version of this notion called uniform validity. If we disabbreviate “|= F ∗” as
“∃ H (H |= F ∗)” (with ∗ ranging over F -admissible interpretations and H
over HPMs), then validity of F in the sense of Definition 5.1 can be writ-
ten as “∀ ∗ ∃ H (H |= F ∗)”. Reversing the order of quantification yields the
following stronger property of uniform validity:
Definition 5.10 A formula F is said to be uniformly valid iff there is an
HPM H such that, for every F -admissible interpretation ∗, H |= F ∗.
Intuitively, uniform validity means existence of an interpretation-independent
solution: since no information regarding interpretation ∗ comes as a part of
input to our play machines, the above HPM H with ∀∗(H |= F ∗) will have to
play in some standard, uniform way that would be successful for any possible
∗.
The term “uniform” is borrowed from [1] as this understanding of validity in
its spirit is close to that in Abramsky and Jagadeesan’s tradition. The concepts
of validity in Lorenzen’s [15] tradition, or in the sense of Japaridze [9,10], also
belong to this category. Common to those uniform-validity-style notions is that
validity there is not defined as being “always true” (true=winnable) as this is
the case with the classical understanding of this concept; in those approaches
the concept of truth is often simply absent, and validity is treated as a basic
concept in its own rights. As for (simply) validity, it is closer to validities in the
sense of Blass [3] or Japaridze [7], and presents a direct generalization of the
corresponding classical concept in that it indeed means being true (winnable)
in every particular setting.
Which of our two versions of validity is more interesting depends on the mo-
tivational standpoint. It is validity rather than uniform validity that tells us
what can be computed in principle. So, a computability-theoretician would
focus on validity. Mathematically, non-validity is generally by an order of
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magnitude more informative — and correspondingly harder to prove — than
non-uniform-validity. Say, the non-validity of p ⊔ ¬p, with the above-quoted
and now successfully verified Conjecture 24.4 of [11] in mind, means existence
of solvable-in-principle yet algorithmically unsolvable problems — the fact
that became known to the mankind only as late as in the 20th century. As for
the non-uniform-validity of p ⊔ ¬p, it is trivial: of course there is no way to
choose one of the two disjuncts that would be true for all possible values of p
because, as the Stone Age intellectuals were probably aware, some p are true
and some are false.
On the other hand, it is uniform validity rather than validity that is of interest
in more applied areas of computer science such as knowledgebase systems (see
Section 6) or resourcebase and planning systems (see Section 26 of [11] or
Section 8 of [13]). In such applications we want a logic on which a universal
problem-solving machine can be based. Such a machine would or should be
able to solve problems represented by formulas of CL3 without any specific
knowledge of the meaning of their atoms, i.e. without knowledge of the actual
interpretation. Remembering what was said about the intuitive meaning of
uniform validity, this concept is exactly what fits the bill.
Anyway, the good news, signifying a successful verification of Conjecture 26.2
of [11] restricted to the language of CL3, is that the two concepts of validity
yield the same logic. If F is uniformly valid, then it is automatically also valid,
as uniform validity is stronger than validity. Suppose now F is valid. Then,
by the completeness part of Theorem 5.9, CL3 ⊢ F . But then, according to
the ‘furthermore’ clause (a) of the same theorem, F is uniformly valid. Thus,
where — in accordance to our present convention — “formula” means formula
of the language of CL3, we have:
Theorem 5.11 A formula is valid if and only if it is uniformly valid.
In many contexts, such as the one of the following section, the above theo-
rem allows us to talk about “the semantics” of CL3 without being specific
regarding which of the two possible underlying concepts of validity we have in
mind.
6 CL3-based applied systems
As demonstrated in Section 4, the language of CL3 presents a convenient
formalism for specifying and studying computational problems and relations
between them. Its axiomatization provides a systematic way to answer not
only the question ‘what can be computed’ but — in view of clause (a) of The-
orem 5.9 — also ‘how can be computed’. Our approach brings logic and theory
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of computing closer together, and its general theoretical importance is obvi-
ous. The property of computability is at least as interesting as the property
of (classical) truth. Moreover, as we saw, computability is also more general
than truth: the latter is nothing but the former restricted to formulas of clas-
sical logic, i.e. elementary formulas. Thus, studying the logic of computability
makes at least as much sense as studying the logic of truth. The latter —
classical logic — is well-studied and well-explored. The former, however, has
never received the treatment it naturally deserves.
The significance of our study is not limited to the theory of computation or
pure logic. The fact that CL3 is a conservative extension of classical logic
makes the former a reasonable and appealing alternative to the latter in every
aspect of its applications. In particular, there are good reasons to try to base
applied theories — such as, say, Peano arithmetic — on CL3 instead of just
classical logic. From axioms of such a theory we would require to be “true”
in our sense, i.e. represent (under the fixed, “standard” interpretation/model)
computable problems, and from its rules of inference require to preserve the
property of computability. One of the particular ways to construct such theo-
ries is to treat the theorems of CL3 as logical axioms and use modus ponens
as the only logical rule of inference. 9 All of the non-logical axioms of the old,
classical-logic-based version of the theory are true elementary formulas and
hence computable in our sense, so they can be automatically included into the
new set of non-logical axioms. To those could be added new, more constructive
and informative axioms that involve choice operators, which would allow us
to delete some or most of the old axioms that have become no longer indepen-
dent. A new, computability-preserving inference rule that could be included
in the CL3-based arithmetic is the constructive rule of induction:
⊓x(F (x)→ F (x+ 1)), F (0) 7→ ⊓xF (x).
No old information whatsoever would be lost when following this path. On the
other hand we would get a much more expressive, constructive and computa-
tionally meaningful theory. All theorems of such a theory would be computable
problems in our sense. E.g., provability of ⊓x⊔y p(x, y) — as opposed to
∀x∃y p(x, y) — would imply that, for every x, a y with p(x, y) not only exists,
but can be algorithmically found. Moreover, such an algorithm itself can be
effectively constructed from a proof of the formula and algorithmic solutions
(winning HPMs) to the problems represented by the non-logical axioms of the
theory. This would be guaranteed by clause (a) of theorem 5.9, Proposition
4.8 and similar facts regarding any additional, non-logical rules of inference if
such are present, such as the above constructive rule of induction.
9 One could show that including some other standard logical rules such as quantifi-
cation rules along with modus ponens generally would not increase the deductive
power of the theory as long as non-logical axioms are (re)written in a proper manner.
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Looks like our approach materializes what the constructivists have been calling
for, yet without unsettling the classically-minded: whatever we could say or
do by the means that classical logic offered, we can automatically still say and
do, with the only difference that now many things we can say and do in a
much more informative and constructive way. Our way of constructivization
of theories is conservative and hence peaceful. This contrasts with many other
attempts to constructivize theories, that typically try to replace classical logic
by weaker logics with “constructive” syntactic features (often in a not very
clear sense) — such as intuitionistic calculus — yielding loss of information
and causing the frustration of those who see nothing wrong with the classical
way of reasoning.
From the purely logical point of view, it could be especially interesting to study
applied theories in the ∀,∃-free sublanguage of the language of CL3. Let us
use CA to denote the version of arithmetic based on the ∀,∃-free fragment
of CL3. Of course, it would be more accurate to use the indefinite article “a”
instead of “the” here, for we are not very specific about what the axioms ofCA
should be. Let us just say that CA has some “standard” collection of basic
axioms characterizing =, +, × and the successor function, and includes the
above constructive rule of induction. For the traditional, classical-logic based
version of arithmetic we use the standard name PA. Due to the big difference
between the underlying logics of CA and PA— enough to remember that one
is decidable and the other is not — CA might have some new and interesting
features. Could we obtain a reasonably expressive yet decidable theory this
way? 10 Generally, how strong a theory (whether decidable or not) could we
get and what would be the fundamental limitations to its deductive power?
Would CA still be able to numerically represent all decidable predicates and
functions as PA does? How much of its own metatheory would CA be able to
formalize? One can show that the property of computability of the problems
represented by formulas of CA can be expressed in the language of CA, so
thatCA, unlike PA, would be able to talk about its own “truth”. One can also
show that PA can constructively prove that everything provable in CA is true
and hence CA is consistent. What are the limitations of the deductive strength
of CA that make it impossible to reproduce the same proof? If there are none,
then what happens to Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems in the context of CA?
How about provability logic in general, which has been so well-studied for PA
(see [8])? These are a few examples of the many intriguing questions naturally
arising in this new framework and calling for answers.
10 Even if the set of non-logical axioms of CA is chosen finite and the rule of induc-
tion is not included, the fact that the underlying logic is decidable does not imply
the decidability of CA itself, for the deduction theorem for CL3-based theories
would work in a way rather different from how it works for classical-logic-based
theories.
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CL3 can as well be of high interest in applied areas of computer science such as
AI. The point is that the language of CL3, being a specification language for
computational problems, is, at the same tame, a coherent and comprehensive
query and knowledge specification language — something that the language of
classical logic fails to be. Where Age(x, y) is the predicate “Person x is y years
old”, the knowledge represented by the formula ∀x∃yAge(x, y) is knowledge
of the almost tautological fact that all people have their age. However, how to
express (the stronger) knowledge of every person’s actual age, which is more
likely to be of relevance in a knowledgebase system? In classical logic we cannot
do this, and this limited expressive power precludes classical logic from serving
as a satisfactory logic of knowledgebase systems, that all the time deal with the
necessity to distinguish between just truth and the system’s actual ability to
know/find/tell what is true. Within the framework of traditional approaches,
classical logic needs to be extended (say, by adding to it epistemic modalities
and the like) to obtain a more or less suitable logic of knowledgebases. In
our case, however, the situation is much more nice: there is no need to have
separate languages and logics for theories on one hand and knowledgebases
on the other hand: the same logic CL3, with its standard semantics, can be
successfully used in both cases, without the need to modify/extend/adjust it.
Back to our example, knowledge of everyone’s actual age can be expressed
by ⊓x⊔yAge(x, y). Obviously the ability of an agent to solve this problem
means its ability to correctly tell each person’s age. Within the framework of
computability logic, the concept of the knowledge of an agent can formally
be defined as the set of the queries that the agent can actually solve. The word
“query” here is a synonym of what we call “problem” (game), and we prefer
to use the former in this new context only because it is more common in the
database and knowledgebase systems lingo.
Let us look at the query intuitions associated with our game semantics. Every
formula whose main operator is ⊔ or ⊔ can be thought of as a question asked
by the user (environment). E.g., Male(Dana)⊔Female(Dana) is the question
“Is Dana male or female?”. Solving this problem, by our semantics for ⊔,
means correctly telling the gender of Dana. Formulas whose main operator
is ⊓ or ⊓, on the other hand, represent questions asked by the system. E.g.,
⊓x(Male(x) ⊔ Female(x)) is the question “Whose gender do you want me to
tell you?”. The user’s response can be “Dana”, which will bring the game
down to the above user-asked question regarding the gender of Dana. Just
as we noted when discussing computational problems, the language of CL3
allows us to form queries of arbitrary complexities and degrees of interactivity.
Negation turns queries into counterqueries; parallel operators generate parallel
queries where both the user and the system can have simultaneous questions
and counterquestions, with→ acting as a query reduction operator; and blind
quantifiers generate imperfect-information queries. Let us look at
∀x
(
⊔yAge(x, y) ∧ (Male(x) ⊔ Female(x))→⊔zBestDiet(z, x)
)
, (3)
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where BestDiet(z, x) is the predicate “z is the best diet for x”. The ability of
the knowledgebase system to solve this query means its ability to determine
the best diet for any person, provided that the system is told that person’s age
and gender — that is, its ability to reduce the ‘best diet’ problem to the ‘age
and gender’ problem. That x is quantified with ∀ rather than ⊓ means that
the system does not need to be told who the person really is. The following is
a possible legal scenario of interaction over this query. The system is waiting
till the user specifies, in the antecedent, the age and gender of x (without
having explicitly specified the value of x). Our semantics automatically makes
the system successful (winner) if the user fails to respond to either of those
two counterqueries. Once responses in the antecedent are received, the system
selects a diet for x. The system has been successful if the diet it selected is
really the best diet for x as long as the user has told it the true age and gender
of x.
Most of the real information systems are interactive, and this makes our logic,
which is designed to be a logic of interactive tasks, a well-suited formal frame-
work for them and an appealing alternative to the more traditional frame-
works. Imagine a medical diagnostics system. What we would like the system
to do is to tell us, for any patient x, the diagnosis y for x. That is, to solve
the query for all x ⊔yDiagnosis(x, y). If here we understand ‘for all’ as ∀,
the problem has no solution: an abstract x cannot be diagnosed even by God.
With ‘for all’ understood as ⊓, the query does have a solution in principle.
But diagnosing a patient just based on his/her identity would require having
all the relevant medical information regarding that patient, which in a real
knowledgebase system is unlikely to be the case. Most likely, the query that
the system solves would look like ∀x(Q(x)→⊔yDiagnosis(x, y)), where Q(x)
is a (counter)query with questions regarding x’s symptoms, blood pressure,
cholesterol level, reaction to various drugs, etc. (one of such questions could
be ⊔z(x = z), effectively turning the main quantifier ∀x into ⊓x). Most
likely Q(x) would not be just a ∧-conjunction of such questions as this was
the case with the antecedent of (3), but rather it would have a more complex
structure, where what questions are asked could depend on the answers that
the user gave to previous questions, yielding a long dialogue with a series of
interspersed moves by both parties.
A more familiar to each of us real-life example is the automated bank account
information system. You dial the bank-by-phone number to inquire about
your balance. But the query that the system solves is not really as simple as
⊔xMyBalance(x). If this was the case, then you would be told your balance
right after dialing the number. Rather, you will have to go through quite a
dialogue, with all sorts of questions regarding your preferences, account type
and number, secret PIN or even mother’s maiden name.
The style of the above examples and the terminology employed to explain
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the associated intuitions are somewhat different from those that we saw in
Section 4 when discussing computational problems and operations on them,
or at the beginning of the present section when discussing CL3-based applied
theories. But notice that the underlying formal semantics remains the same:
whether we talk about valid principles of computability, constructive applied
theories, or knowledgebase systems — in each case we deal with the same
(language of) CL3 with its standard semantics. Using the same logic CL3 in
all these cases is possible only due to Theorem 5.11 though. The reason for the
failure of the principle p ⊔ ¬p in the context of computability theory is that
the corresponding problem may have no algorithmic solution. That is, p ⊔¬p
is not valid. The reason for the failure of the same principle in the context
of knowledgebase systems is much simpler. An intelligent system may fail to
solve the problem Male(Dana)⊔¬Male(Dana) not because the latter has no
algorithmic solution (of course it has one), but simply because the system does
not possess sufficient knowledge to determine Dana’s gender. In particular, the
system with empty non-logical (but perfect logical) knowledge would not be
able to solve p ⊔ ¬p because it is not uniformly valid. According to Theorem
5.11, however, validity and uniform validity are equivalent. Hence, the logic of
computability, which is about what can be computed in principle, is the same
as the logic of knowledgebase systems, which is about what can be actually
solved by knowledge-based agents.
The point to be made here is that our approach brings together applied the-
ories and knowledgebase systems, traditionally studied by different clans of re-
searchers with different motivations, visions and methods. Every computability-
logic-based applied theory automatically is a knowledgebase system, and vice
versa. Knowledgebase systems can be axiomatized in exactly the same way
as we would axiomatize arithmetic. The set of non-logical axioms of such
a system may include atomic formulas representing factual knowledge, such
as Father(Bob,Jane) (“Bob is Jane’s father”); it can include nonatomic ele-
mentary formulas representing general knowledge, such as ∀x(x × (y + 1) =
(x× y)+ x) or ∀x(∃yFather(x, y)→ Male(x)); and it can include nonelemen-
tary formulas such as⊓x⊓y⊔z(z = x×y) or⊓x⊔yAge(x, y), expressing the
ability of the system to compute the × function or its knowledge of (ability
to tell) everyone’s age. These axioms would represent what can be called the
explicit knowledge of the system — the basic set of problems/queries that the
system is able to solve. And the set of theorems of such a system would rep-
resent its overall — perhaps what can be called implicit — knowledge. Each
theorem would be a query that the system, with CL3 built into it, is actually
capable of solving: as we noted when discussing CL3-based applied theories, a
solution to the problem/query expressed by a formula F can be automatically
obtained from a proof of F and known solutions to the non-logical axioms.
Furthermore, one can show that it is not even necessary for the knowledgebase
system to know actual solutions (winning HPMs) for its axioms. Rather, it
would suffice to have unlimited access to machines or other knowledgebase
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systems (external computational/informational resources) that solve
those axioms. “Unlimited access” here means the possibility to query (play
against) those resources any finite number of times and perhaps in parallel.
There is no need for the system to know how exactly those external resources
do their job as long as they do it right. The system would still be able to dy-
namically solve any theorem F , even if no longer able to construct an actual
HPM that solves F .
Extending the meaning of the term “resource” to physical resources as well,
computability-logic-based knowledgebase systems can be further generalized
to resourcebase systems and systems for resource-bound planning and action.
See Section 26 of [11] for a discussion and illustrations. A more elaborated
discussion of applied systems based on computability logic is given in Section
8 of [13].
PART 2
This part can be considered a technical appendix to Part 1. It is exclusively
devoted to proofs of our two main results: Theorem 5.9 (Sections 7-9) and
Theorem 5.7 (Section 10).
7 Preliminaries
The concept of admissible interpretation can be naturally extended from for-
mulas to sets of formulas: For a set S of formulas, an S-admissible interpre-
tation is an interpretation that is F -admissible for each F ∈ S. To simplify
things, we will assume throughout the rest of this paper that all the formulas
we deal with are from some fixed set S, and by “interpretation” we will always
mean S-admissible interpretation.
Reiterating and extending our earlier conventions, in what follows E, F,G,
H, I, J,K will be exclusively used as a metavariable for formulas, α, β for
moves, ∗,⋆ for interpretations, x, y, z, s, u, w for variables, a, b, c, d for constants,
t for terms and e, f for valuations.
The following lemma, on which our reasoning will often rely implicitly, is just
a straightforward observation:
Lemma 7.1 For any formula F (x1, . . . , xn), the set Lr
(F (t1,...,tn))∗
e does not
depend on e, ∗ or t1, . . . , tn.
With the above fact in mind and in accordance with our conventions from
37
Section 2, we will usually omit the parameter e in the expression LrF
∗
e , as well
as omit “with respect to e” in the phrase “legal run of F ∗ with respect to e”.
Remember also from Section 2 that e can as well be omitted in the expression
WnAe when A is a constant game and hence e is irrelevant.
Lemma 7.2 Suppose x is a variable occurring in a formula F . Then, for any
interpretation ∗, constant c and subformula G of F , (G[x/c])∗ = G∗[x/c].
Proof. Assume x occurs in F . Pick an arbitrary interpretation ∗, constant
c and subformula G of F . Our goal statement (G[x/c])∗ = G∗[x/c] can be
proven by induction on the complexity of G. We will only outline the proof
scheme. Verification of details can be done by a routine analysis of the relevant
definitions, which we lazily omit and just say something like “it is easy to see
that...”
Assume G is an n-ary nonlogical atom p(t1, . . . , tn) (the case of logical atoms
⊥,⊤ is trivial). Let p∗ = A(x1, . . . , xn).
First consider the case when x is not among t1, . . . , tn. Then G[x/c] = G,
so it would be sufficient to show that G∗ = G∗[x/c]. But indeed, by our
convention, ∗ is F -admissible; since x occurs in F , according to the definition
of F -admissible interpretation, either A(x1, . . . , xn) does not depend on x, or
x is among x1, . . . , xn. In either case it can be seen that A(t1, . . . , tn) does not
depend on x. Hence A(t1, . . . , tn)[x/c] = A(t1, . . . , tn), i.e. G
∗[x/c] = G∗.
Next consider the case when x is among t1, . . . , tn. For convenience of visual-
ization, we may assume that t1 = . . . = ti = x and all tj with i < j ≤ n are
different from x. Then G[x/c] = p(c, . . . , c, ti+1, . . . , tn) and hence (G[x/c])
∗ =
A(c, . . . , c, ti+1, . . . , tn). It is not hard to verify that A(c, . . . , c, ti+1, . . . , tn) =
A(t1, . . . , tn)[x/c], so that we get (G[x/c])
∗ = G∗[x/c]. This competes our proof
of the basis case of induction.
For the inductive step, let us consider the case when G = H1 ∧ H2 as an
example. The following equation is based on the obvious fact that substitution
of terms commutes with ∧:
((H1 ∧H2)[x/c])
∗ = ((H1[x/c]) ∧ (H2[x/c]))
∗. (4)
Next, the operation ∗ also commutes with ∧, so that we have
((H1[x/c]) ∧ (H2[x/c]))
∗ = (H1[x/c])
∗ ∧ (H2[x/c])
∗.
By the induction hypothesis, (H1[x/c])
∗ = H∗1 [x/c] and (H2[x/c])
∗ = H∗2 [x/c],
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so we have
(H1[x/c])
∗ ∧ (H2[x/c])
∗ = (H∗1 [x/c]) ∧ (H
∗
2 [x/c]).
Since the game operation of substitution of variables obviously commutes with
∧, we have
(H∗1 [x/c]) ∧ (H
∗
2 [x/c]) = (H
∗
1 ∧H
∗
2 )[x/c].
Finally, again because ∗ commutes with ∧, we have
(H∗1 ∧H
∗
2 )[x/c] = (H1 ∧H2)
∗[x/c]. (5)
The chain of equations from (4) to (5) yields ((H1 ∧ H2)[x/c])
∗ = (H1 ∧
H2)
∗[x/c], i.e. (G[x/c])∗ = G∗[x/c].
The cases with the other propositional connectives will be handled in a similar
way, based on the fact that the three operations: ∗, [x/c] (as an operation on
formulas) and [x/c] (as an operation on problems) commute with ¬,∨,→,⊓,⊔
just as they commute with ∧. Moreover, those three operations commute with
Qy as well, where Q is any of the four quantifiers and y is a variable different
from x, so the case G = QyH with y 6= x can also be handled in a way similar
to the way we handled the case G = H1 ∧H2.
The only remaining case is G = QxH (one can see that [x/c] does not commute
with Qx). Obviously we have (QxH)[x/c] = QxH , so that
((QxH)[x/c])∗ = (QxH)∗. (6)
The operation ∗ commutes with Qx, and therefore
(QxH)∗ = Qx(H∗).
Qx(H∗) obviously does not depend on x, which easily implies
Qx(H∗) = (Qx(H∗))[x/c].
Again by the fact that ∗ commutes with Qx, we have
(Qx(H∗))[x/c] = (QxH)∗[x/c]. (7)
The chain of equations from (6) to (7) yields ((QxH)[x/c])∗ = (QxH)∗[x/c],
i.e. (G[x/c])∗ = G∗[x/c]. ✷
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By a perfect interpretation we mean an interpretation that interprets any
n-ary predicate letter p as a finitary predicate A(x1, . . . , xn) that does not
depend on any variables others than x1, . . . , xn. Every perfect interpretation
∗
is nothing but a model in the classical sense (classical model) with domain
{constants}— the model that interprets each constant c as the element c of the
domain and interprets each n-ary predicate letter p with p∗ = A(x1, . . . , xn)
as the predicate A(x1, . . . , xn). Such a predicate A(x1, . . . , xn) is generally
≤ n-ary in our sense but can be thought of as exactly n-ary under the more
traditional understanding of n-ary predicates as sets of n-tuples of objects
of the domain (the understanding that we slightly revised in Section 2). By a
closed formula we mean a formula not containing free occurrences of variables.
A straightforward induction based on a routine analysis of relevant definitions
reveals that:
Lemma 7.3 For any formula F and perfect interpretation ∗, the game F ∗ (is
finitary and) does not depend on any variables that do not occur free in F ;
hence, if F is closed, F ∗ is a constant game.
With the above fact in mind and in accordance with our conventions, as long as
F is closed and ∗ is perfect, we can always safely omit the valuation parameter
e in WnF
∗
e and simply write Wn
F ∗ as this is done in Lemma 7.4 below.
Remembering the observations made in Section 4 about the classical behavior
of our operations ⊥, ⊤, ¬, ∧, ∨, →, ∀, ∃, we obviously have:
Lemma 7.4 For any closed elementary formula F and perfect interpretation
∗, WnF
∗
〈〉 = ⊤ iff F is true in ∗ understood as a classical model.
Based on the above fact, for a closed elementary formula F and perfect in-
terpretation ∗, the phrases “F is true in ∗” and “WnF
∗
〈〉 = ⊤” will be used
interchangeably. Remember also from Section 2 that, for a predicate A, an-
other way to say “WnAe 〈〉 = ⊤” or “A is true at e” is to say “e[A] is true”.
Let ∗ be an arbitrary interpretation and e an arbitrary valuation. The perfect
interpretation induced by (∗, e) is the interpretation ⋆ such that, for every
n-ary predicate letter p with p∗ = A(x1, . . . , xn), we have p
⋆ = A′(x1, . . . , xn),
where A′(x1, . . . , xn) is the unique game such that, for any tuple c1, . . . , cn
of constants, A′(c1, . . . , cn) = e[A(c1, . . . , cn)]. This means nothing but that
A′(x1, . . . , xn) is the predicate such that A
′(c1, . . . , cn) is true (at whatever
valuation) iff A(c1, . . . , cn) is true at e. Note that while A(c1, . . . , cn) may
depend on some hidden variables, A′(c1, . . . , cn) is a constant game.
For a formula F , we will be using the notation ‖F ‖ for the elementarization
of F . The following two lemmas can be verified by straightforward induction
on the complexity of F :
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Lemma 7.5 For any formula F , interpretation ∗ and valuation e, WnF
∗
e 〈〉 =
Wn‖F‖
∗
e 〈〉.
Lemma 7.6 Suppose ⋆ is the perfect interpretation induced by (∗, e), and F
is a closed elementary 11 formula. Then e[F ∗] = F ⋆.
A valuation f is said to be finite iff there is a finite set ~x of variables such
that for every variable y 6∈ ~x, f(y) = 0. A representation of a finite val-
uation f is a set {x1/c1, . . . , xn/cn}, where x1, . . . , xn are pairwise distinct
variables such that each variable x with f(x) 6= 0 is among x1, . . . , xn, and
c1, . . . , cn are constants with f(x1) = c1, . . . , f(xn) = cn. We will say that such
a set {x1/c1, . . . , xn/cn} represents f . By abuse of terminology, we will often
identify a representation of a given finite valuation with that valuation itself.
Where f is a valuation and F is a formula, fF will denote the result of
substituting in F every free occurrence of every variable x by the constant
f(x). That is, fF = F [x1/f(x1), . . . , xn/f(xn)], where x1, . . . , xn are all the
free variables of F . Thus, fF is always a closed formula. Generally, we say
that G is an instance of F iff G = fF for some valuation f .
We say that a valuation f is F -distinctive iff for any free terms t1 and t2 of
F , as long as t1 6= t2, we have f(t1) 6= f(t2).
Lemma 7.7 For any formula F , interpretation ∗, and valuations e and f that
agree on all free variables of F , we have e[F ∗] = e[(fF )∗].
Proof. Assume F , ∗, e, f are as above. Let x1, . . . , xn be all the free variables
of F , and let c1 = e(x1) = f(x1), . . . , cn = e(xn) = f(xn). Obviously we have
e[F ∗] = e[F ∗[x1/c1, . . . , xn/cn]]. (8)
Observe that F ∗[x1/c1, . . . , xn/cn] = (. . . ((F
∗[x1/c1])[x2/c2]) . . .)[xn/cn], and
similarly for “F” instead of “F ∗”. Therefore, applying Lemma 7.2 n times, we
get F ∗[x1/c1, . . . , xn/cn] = (F [x1/c1, . . . , xn/cn])
∗ and hence
e[F ∗[x1/c1, . . . , xn/cn]] = e[(F [x1/c1, . . . , xn/cn])
∗]. (9)
But F [x1/c1, . . . , xn/cn] is nothing but fF , so we have (F [x1/c1, . . . , xn/cn])
∗ =
(fF )∗ and hence
e[(F [x1/c1, . . . , xn/cn])
∗] = e[(fF )∗]. (10)
11 In fact the lemma holds for any closed formula, but for our purposes the elemen-
tary case is sufficient.
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Equations (8), (9) and (10) yield e[F ∗] = e[(fF )∗]. ✷
Now we define a function that, for a formula F and a surface occurrence O
in F , returns a string α called the F -specification of O, which is said to
F -specify O. In particular:
• The occurrence of F in itself is F -specified by the empty string.
• If F is ¬G, ∀xG or ∃xG, then an occurrence that happens to be in G is
F -specified by the same string that G-specifies that occurrence.
• If F is G1 ∧ . . . ∧ Gn, G1 ∨ . . . ∨ Gn or G1 → G2, then an occurrence that
happens to be in Gi is F -specified by i.α, where α is the Gi-specification of
that occurrence.
Example: The second occurrence of p⊔ q in F = G ∨ (p⊔ q) ∨¬(p→ ∃x(G ∧
(p ⊔ q))) is F -specified by the string “3.2.2.”.
With Lemma 7.2 in mind and based on Proposition 4.7, the following lemma
can be easily verified by induction on the complexity of F , the routine details
of which we omit:
Lemma 7.8 For every formula F , move α and interpretation ∗:
(a) 〈⊥α〉 ∈ LrF
∗
iff one of the following two conditions holds:
(1) α = βi, where β is the F -specification of a positive (resp. negative)
surface occurrence of a subformula G1 ⊓ . . . ⊓Gn (resp. G1 ⊔ . . . ⊔Gn)
and i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. In this case 〈⊥α〉F ∗ = H∗, where H is the result of
substituting in F the above occurrence by Gi.
(2) α = βc, where β is the F -specification of a positive (resp. negative)
surface occurrence of a subformula ⊓xG(x) (resp. ⊔xG(x)) and c ∈
{constants}. In this case 〈⊥α〉F ∗ = H∗, where H is the result of sub-
stituting in F the above occurrence by G(c).
(b) 〈⊤α〉 ∈ LrF
∗
iff one of the following two conditions holds:
(1) α = βi, where β is the F -specification of a negative (resp. positive)
surface occurrence of a subformula G1 ⊓ . . . ⊓Gn (resp. G1 ⊔ . . . ⊔Gn)
and i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. In this case 〈⊤α〉F ∗ = H∗, where H is the result of
substituting in F the above occurrence by Gi.
(2) α = βc, where β is the F -specification of a negative (resp. positive)
surface occurrence of a subformula ⊓xG(x) (resp. ⊔xG(x)) and c ∈
{constants}. In this case 〈⊤α〉F ∗ = H∗, where H is the result of sub-
stituting in F the above occurrence by G(c).
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8 Soundness of CL3
Proposition 8.1 If CL3 ⊢ F , then F is valid (any formula F ). Moreover,
there is an effective procedure that takes an CL3-proof of a formula F and
returns an HPM H such that, for all ∗, H |= F ∗.
Proof. Assume CL3 ⊢ F . Let us fix a particular CL3-proof of F . We will be
referring to at as “the proof”, and referring to the formulas occurring in the
proof as “proof formulas”. We assume that this is a sequence (rather than tree)
of formulas without repetitions, and that every proof formula comes with a
fixed justification— a record indicating by which rule and from what premises
the formula was derived.
It would be sufficient to describe an effective way of constructing an EPM
E with ‘for all ∗, E |= F ∗’. By Proposition 3.2, such an EPM E can then be
effectively converted into an HPM H with ‘for all ∗, H |= F ∗’.
We construct the EPM E , that will play in the role of ⊤, as follows. At the
beginning, this machine creates two records on its work tape: E to hold a
formula, and f to hold (a representation of) a finite valuation. E is initialized
to F , and f initialized to {x1/c1, . . . , xq/cq}, where x1, . . . , xq are all the free
variables of F and, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ q, ci is the value assigned to xi by
the valuation spelled on the valuation tape. After the initialization step, the
machine follows the algorithm LOOP described below.
Procedure LOOP: While E is a proof formula, do one of the following,
depending on which of the three rules was used (last) to derive E in the proof:
Case of Rule A: Keep granting permission until the adversary makes a move
α that satisfies the conditions of one of the following two subcases, and then
act as the corresponding subcase prescribes:
Subcase (i): α = βi, where β E-specifies a positive (resp. negative) sur-
face occurrence of a subformula G1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Gn (resp. G1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Gn) and
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Let H be the result of substituting in E the above occur-
rence by Gi. Then update E to H , and update f by deleting in it all pairs
u/d where u is not a free variable of H .
Subcase (ii): α = βc, where β E-specifies a positive (resp. negative)
surface occurrence of a subformula ⊓xG(x) (resp. ⊔xG(x)) and c ∈
{constants}. LetH be the premise 12 of E that is the result of substituting
12 If there are many such premises, select the lexicographically smallest one. The
presence of more than one such premise, however, signifies that the proof has some
(easy-to-get-rid-of) redundancies, and we may safely assume that this is not the
case.
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in E the above occurrence by G(y), where y does not occur in E. Then
update E to H , and update f to f ∪ {y/c} (unless x did not really have
free occurrences in G(x), in which case f should stay the same as it was).
Case of Rule B1: Let H be the premise of E in the proof. H is the result of
substituting, in E, a certain negative (resp. positive) surface occurrence of a
subformula G1⊓ . . .⊓Gn (resp. G1⊔ . . .⊔Gn) by Gi for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Let β be the E-specification of that occurrence. Then make the move βi,
update E to H , and update f by deleting in it all pairs u/d where u is not
a free variable of H .
Case of Rule B2: Let H be the premise of E in the proof. H is the result of
substituting, in E, a certain negative (resp. positive) surface occurrence of a
subformula ⊓xG(x) (resp. ⊔xG(x)) by G(t) for some term t such that (if t
is a variable) neither the above occurrence of⊓xG(x) (resp. ⊔xG(x)) in F
nor any of the free occurrences of x in G(x) are in the scope of ∀t, ∃t,⊓t or
⊔t. Let β be the E-specification of the above occurrence of ⊓xG(x) (resp.
⊔xG(x)). Let c = f(t) if t is either a free variable of E or a constant, 13
and c = 0 otherwise. Then make the move βc, update E to H , and — if
t is a variable — update f to f ∪ {t/c} (unless x did not really have free
occurrences in G(x), in which case f should stay the same as it was).
It is obvious that (the description of) E can be constructed effectively from
the CL3-proof of F . What we need to do now is to show that E wins F ∗ for
every ∗. In doing so, we will assume that E ’s adversary never makes illegal
moves. By Remark 3.1, making such an assumption is perfectly legitimate.
Pick an arbitrary interpretation ∗, an arbitrary valuation e and an arbitrary
e-computation branch B of E . Fix Γ as the run spelled by B. Consider the
work of E in B. For each i ≥ 1 such that LOOP makes at least i iterations in
B, let Ei and fi denote the values of the records E and f at the beginning of
the ith iteration of LOOP, and Ki denote fiEi. Thus, E1 = F and, by Lemma
7.7, e[F ∗] = e[K∗1 ]. Our goal is to show that B is fair and Wn
F ∗
e 〈Γ〉 = ⊤, i.e.
WnK
∗
1
e 〈Γ〉 = ⊤.
Evidently Ei+1 is always one of the premises of Ei in the proof, so that LOOP
is iterated only a finite number of times. For the same reason, the value of
record E is always a proof formula (incidentally, this means that the while
condition of LOOP is always satisfied, so that the reason why LOOP is only
iterated a finite number of times is simply that one of the iterations never
terminates). Fix l as the number of iterations of LOOP. The lth iteration
deals with the case of Rule A, for otherwise there would be a next iteration.
This implies that
El is stable. (11)
13 Remember that when t is a constant, f(t) = t.
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For each i with 1 ≤ i ≤ l, let Θi be the sequence of the moves made by the
players by the beginning of the ith iteration of LOOP, where the moves made
by E are ⊤-labeled and the moves made by its adversary ⊥-labeled.
For each i with 1 ≤ i ≤ l, we have Θi ∈ Lr
K∗
1 and 〈Θi〉K∗1 = K
∗
i . (12)
This statement can be proven by induction on i. The basis case with i = 1
is trivial. Now consider an arbitrary i with 1 ≤ i < l. By the induction
hypothesis, Θi ∈ Lr
K∗
1 and 〈Θi〉K∗1 = K
∗
i . If the ith iteration of LOOP deals
with the case of Rule B1 or B2, then exactly one move α is made during
that iteration, and this move is by the machine, so that Θi+1 = 〈Θi,⊤α〉. A
simple analysis of the corresponding steps of our algorithm, in conjunction
with Lemma 7.8(b), can convince us that 〈⊤α〉 ∈ LrK
∗
i and 〈⊤α〉K∗i = K
∗
i+1.
With the equalities Θi+1 = 〈Θi,⊤α〉 and K∗i = 〈Θi〉K
∗
1 in mind, the former
then implies Θi+1 ∈ Lr
K∗
1 and the latter implies 〈Θi+1〉K∗1 = K
∗
i+1. Suppose
now the ith iteration of LOOP deals with the case of RuleA. Then the machine
does not make a move. This means that ⊥ makes a move α, for otherwise we
would have i = l. Our assumption that⊥ never makes illegal moves here means
nothing but that 〈Θi,⊥α〉 ∈ Lr
K∗
1 and therefore (as K∗i = 〈Θi〉K
∗
1) 〈⊥α〉 ∈
LrK
∗
i . Applying Lemma 7.8(a) to the fact that 〈⊥α〉 ∈ LrK
∗
i and analyzing the
corresponding steps of our algorithm, it is easy to see that Θi+1 = 〈Θi,⊥α〉
and 〈⊥α〉K∗i = K
∗
i+1. Hence Θi+1 ∈ Lr
K∗
1 and 〈Θi+1〉K∗1 = K
∗
i+1. Statement
(12) is proven.
Γ = Θl. (13)
Indeed. Since the lth iteration of LOOP deals with the case of Rule A, E does
not make any moves during that iteration. We claim that ⊥ does not make
any moves either, so that run Γ that is generated in the play is exactly Θl.
To verify this claim, suppose, for a contradiction, that during the lth iteration
of LOOP ⊥ makes a move α. As we assume that ⊥ plays legal, we should
have 〈Θl,⊥α〉 ∈ Lr
K∗
1 . In view of (12), this means that 〈⊥α〉 ∈ LrK
∗
l . From
Lemma 7.8(a), just as this was observed in the proof of (12), it is obvious that
then α would satisfy the conditions of either Subcase (i) or Subcase (ii), and
then there would be an (l + 1)th iteration, which, however, is not the case.
Statement (13) is proven.
The fact that the last iteration of LOOP deals with the case of Rule A and ⊥
does not make any moves during that iteration guarantees that E will grant
permission infinitely many times during that iteration, so that branch B is
fair. Thus, in order to complete our proof of Proposition 8.1, what remains to
show is that WnK
∗
1
e 〈Γ〉 = ⊤.
According to (12), Θl is a legal position of K
∗
1 and 〈Θl〉K
∗
1 = K
∗
l . This implies
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that WnK
∗
1
e 〈Θl〉 =Wn
K∗
l
e 〈〉. But, by (13), Θl = Γ. Hence
WnK
∗
1
e 〈Γ〉 =Wn
K∗
l
e 〈〉. (14)
Suppose, for a contradiction, that WnK
∗
1
e 〈Γ〉 6= ⊤. Then, by (14), Wn
K∗
l
e 〈〉 6=
⊤, whence, according to Lemma 7.5,Wn‖Kl‖
∗
e 〈〉 6= ⊤. Then Lemma 7.6 implies
that Wn‖Kl‖
⋆
〈〉 6= ⊤, where ⋆ is the perfect interpretation induced by (∗, e).
That is, ‖Kl‖ is false in
⋆ understood as a classical model. But this is impossible
because, by (11), ‖El‖ is classically valid and hence ‖Kl‖, which is an instance
of ‖El‖, is true in all classical models. ✷
9 Completeness of CL3
Lemma 9.1 Let t be any term, F (t) any formula, and t′ any term that does
not occur in F (t). Then CL3 ⊢ F (t) iff CL3 ⊢ F (t′).
Proof. This lemma can be proven by induction on the lengths of CL3-
derivations. The step corresponding to Rule A will rely on a similar fact
known from classical logic. The routine details of this induction are left to the
reader. ✷
In our completeness proof for CL3 we will employ the complementary logic
CL3′, whose language is the same as that of CL3 and which is given by the
following rules:
A. ~H 7→ F , where F is instable and ~H is a set of formulas satisfying the
following conditions:
(i) Whenever F has a negative (resp. positive) surface occurrence of a sub-
formula G1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Gn (resp. G1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Gn), for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ~H
contains the result of replacing that occurrence in F by Gi;
(ii) Whenever F has a negative (resp. positive) surface occurrence of a
subformula ⊓xG(x) (resp. ⊔xG(x)), ~H contains the result of replacing
that occurrence in F by G(y), where y is a variable that does not occur
in F .
(iii) Whenever F has a negative (resp. positive) surface occurrence of a sub-
formula⊓xG(x) (resp.⊔xG(x)) and t is a free term of F , ~H contains the
result of replacing in F the above occurrence of ⊓xG(x) (resp. ⊔xG(x))
by G(y) and 14 all free occurrences of t by y, where y is a variable that
does not occur in F .
14 “and” = “and replacing in the resulting formula”.
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B1. F ′ 7→ F , where F ′ is the result of replacing in F a positive (resp.
negative) surface occurrence of a subformula G1⊓. . .⊓Gn (resp. G1⊔. . .⊔Gn)
by Gi for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
B2. F ′ 7→ F , where F ′ is the result of replacing in F a positive (resp.
negative) surface occurrence of a subformula ⊓xG(x) (resp. ⊔xG(x)) by
G(y), where y is a variable that does not occur in F .
Lemma 9.2 If CL3 6⊢ F , then CL3′ ⊢ F (any formula F ).
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction on the complexity of F . Assume
CL3 6⊢ F . There are two cases to consider:
Case 1: F is stable. Then one of the following two subcases must hold (other-
wise F would be CL3-derivable by Rule A):
Subcase 1.1: There is a CL3-unprovable formula H that is the result of re-
placing in F some positive (resp. negative) surface occurrence of a subformula
G1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Gn (resp. G1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Gn) by Gi for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. By the
induction hypothesis CL3′ ⊢ H , whence, by Rule B1, CL3′ ⊢ F .
Subcase 1.2: There is a CL3-unprovable formula H that is the result of re-
placing in F some positive (resp. negative) surface occurrence of a subformula
⊓xG(x) (resp. ⊔xG(x)) by G(y), where y is a variable that does not occur in
F . By the induction hypothesis CL3′ ⊢ H , whence, by Rule B2, CL3′ ⊢ F .
Case 2: F is instable. Let ~H be a minimal set of formulas satisfying the three
conditions (i)-(iii) of Rule A of CL3′. We claim that
None of the elements of ~H is CL3-provable. (15)
To show this, consider an arbitrary element H of ~H . One of the following three
subcases must hold:
Subcase 2.1: H is the result of replacing in F a negative (resp. positive) surface
occurrence of a subformula G1 ⊓ . . .⊓Gn (resp. G1 ⊔ . . .⊔Gn) by Gi for some
1 ≤ i ≤ n. If CL3 ⊢ H , then F would be CL3-derivable from H by Rule B1,
which is a contradiction.
Subcase 2.2: H is the result of replacing in F a negative (resp. positive) surface
occurrence of a subformula ⊓xG(x) (resp. ⊔xG(x)) by G(y) for some y not
occurring in F . Just as in the previous subcase, CL3 ⊢ H is impossible, for
otherwise, by Rule B2, we would have CL3 ⊢ F .
Subcase 2.3: H is the result of replacing in F a negative (resp. positive) surface
occurrence of a subformula ⊓xG(x) (resp. ⊔xG(x)) by G(y) and all free
occurrences of some term t by y, where y is a variable that does not occur in
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F . Notice that then F [t/y] follows follows from H by Rule B2 of CL3. So,
if CL3 ⊢ H , then CL3 ⊢ F [t/y], and therefore, by Lemma 9.1, CL3 ⊢ F .
Again a contradiction, and (15) is thus proven.
Applying the induction hypothesis to (15), we conclude that each element of
~H is CL3′-provable, whence, by Rule A, CL3′ ⊢ F . ✷
Remember that a (finitary) predicate A is said to be of complexity Σ2 iff
it is (“can be written as”) ∃y∀zB for some decidable predicate B; and A is
of complexity ∆2 iff both A and ¬A are of complexity Σ2. The rest of this
section is devoted to a proof of the following proposition:
Proposition 9.3 If CL3 6⊢ F , then F is not valid (any formula F ).
In particular, if CL3 6⊢ F , then F ∗ is not computable for some interpretation
∗ that interprets atoms as finitary predicates of complexity ∆2.
Proof. Assume CL3 6⊢ F . Then, by Lemma 9.2,CL3′ ⊢ F . Let us fix a CL3′-
proof for F , call it “the proof” and call the formulas occurring in the proof
“proof formulas”. Our conventions about what a proof means are the same as
in Section 8. In particular, we assume that the proof has no repetitions: every
proof formula appears in it exactly once. Based on the proof, we are going to
construct the fair EPM E which will be shown to be such that no HPM H
wins F ∗ against E on ec for an appropriately selected interpretation ∗ (which
does not depend on H) and valuation ec. Our selection of such ∗ and ec will
be based on a diagonalization-style idea.
Let us agree for the rest of this section that x1, . . . , xq are all the (pairwise
distinct) free variables of F , and that
Convention 9.3.1
a) e always means the (arbitrary but fixed) valuation spelled on the valuation
tape of E ;
b) B always stands for an (arbitrary but fixed) e-computation branch of E .
The work of E consists of three stages, that we call the preinitialization, ini-
tialization and postinitialization stages. During the preinitialization stage, E
checks whether e is F -distinctive (see page 41). If e passes the test for F -
distinctiveness, E goes to the initialization stage. Otherwise E simply goes
into an infinite loop in a permission state to formally ensure fairness, thus for-
ever remaining in the preinitialization stage. During the initialization stage,
E creates two records: E to hold a formula, and f to hold (a description
of) a finite valuation. E initializes E to F and f to {x1/e(x1), . . . , xq/e(xq)},
and goes to the postinitialization stage. During the postinitialization stage, E
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simply follows the following procedure:
Procedure LOOP: While E is a proof formula and f is an E-distinctive
valuation, do one of the following, depending on which of the three rules was
used (last) to derive E in the proof:
Case of Rule A: Keep granting permission until the adversary makes a move
α. Then act depending on which of the following four subcases applies:
Subcase (i): α = βi, where β E-specifies a negative (resp. positive) sur-
face occurrence of a subformula G1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Gn (resp. G1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Gn) and
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Let H be the result of substituting in E the above occur-
rence by Gi. Then update E to H , and update f by deleting in it all pairs
x/d such that x is not a free variable of H .
Subcase (ii): α = βc, where β E-specifies a negative (resp. positive)
surface occurrence of a subformula ⊓xG(x) (resp. ⊔xG(x)) and c is a
constant not occurring in fE. Let H be the premise 15 of E that is the
result of substituting in E the above occurrence by G(y), where y is a
variable that does not occur in E. Then update E to H , and update f to
f ∪{y/c} (unless x did not really have free occurrences in G(x), in which
case f should stay as it was).
Subcase (iii): α = βc, where β E-specifies a negative (resp. positive)
surface occurrence of a subformula ⊓xG(x) (resp. ⊔xG(x)) and c is a
constant that occurs in fE. Let t be the free term of E with f(t) = c. Let
H be the premise 16 of E that is the result of substituting in E the above
occurrence of ⊓xG(x) (resp. ⊔xG(x)) by G(y) and all free occurrences
of t by y, where y is a variable that does not occur in E. Then update E
to H ; update f to f ∪ {y/c} if t is a constant, and to (f −{t/c})∪ {y/c}
if t is a variable.
Subcase (iv): α does not satisfy any of the above conditions (i)-(iii). Then
go into an infinite loop in a permission state.
Case of Rule B1: Let H be the premise of E in the proof. H is the result of
substituting, in E, a certain positive (resp. negative) surface occurrence of a
subformula G1⊓ . . .⊓Gn (resp. G1⊔ . . .⊔Gn) by Gi for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Let β be the E-specification of that occurrence. Then make the move βi,
update E to H , and update f by deleting in it all pairs x/d such that x is
not a free variable of H .
Case of Rule B2: Let H be the premise of E in the proof. H is the result
of substituting, in E, a certain positive (resp. negative) surface occurrence
of a subformula ⊓xG(x) (resp. ⊔xG(x)) by G(y) for some variable y not
occurring in F . Let β be the E-specification of that occurrence. Let c be the
smallest constant not occurring in fE. Then make the move βc, update E to
15 As in Section 8, if there are many such premises, select the lexicographically
smallest one.
16 Again, select the lexicographically smallest one if there are many such premises.
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H , and update f to f ∪{y/c} (unless x did not really have free occurrences
in G(x), in which case f should stay as it was).
Lemma 9.3.2 Suppose e is F -distinctive. For each i ≥ 1 such that LOOP
is iterated at least i times in B, let Ei and fi be the values of E and f at the
beginning of the ith iteration. Then, for each such i (in clauses (a)-(c)), we
have:
(a) Ei is a proof formula.
(b) fi is an Ei-distinctive valuation.
(c) As long as i > 1, Ei is a premise of Ei−1 in the proof.
(d) LOOP is iterated a finite, nonzero number of times in B.
(e) Where l is the number of iterations of LOOP in B, El is derived by Rule
A and hence is instable.
(f) B is a fair branch.
Proof. Clauses (a)-(c) are obvious from the description of LOOP. Formally
they can be verified by straightforward induction on i. Note that clauses (a)
and (b) imply that the while condition of LOOP is always satisfied.
In view of the assumption of the lemma regarding e, e will pass the test for
F -distinctiveness during the preinitialization stage, so LOOP will be iterated
at least once. And clause (c) implies that the number of iterations of LOOP
cannot be infinite — in particular, cannot exceed the number of proof formulas.
This proves clause (d).
For the remaining two clauses, assume l ≥ 1 is the number of iterations of
LOOP in B. As El is a proof formula, it should be derived by one of the three
rules of CL3′. Among those rules, only Rule A is possible, for otherwise, as
it is easy to see, we would have a next iteration of LOOP. Thus, clause (e)
holds.
For clause (f), we want to show that E will grant permission infinitely many
times — in particular, it will do so during the lth iteration of LOOP. By clause
(e), the lth iteration of LOOP deals with the case of Rule A. What E does
during that iteration is that it keeps granting permission until the adversary
responds by a move. If such a response is never made, permission will be
granted infinitely many times. Suppose now the adversary makes a move α. α
cannot be a move that satisfies the conditions of one of the Subcases (i)-(iii),
for then we would have an (l + 1)th iteration of LOOP. Thus, we deal with
Subcase (iv), in which, again, E will grant permission infinitely many times.
✷
Lemma 9.3.3 E is fair.
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Proof. Keeping in mind that e and B are arbitrary (Convention 9.3.1), all
we need to show is that B is fair, i.e. permission will be granted infinitely
many times in B. By Lemma 9.3.2(f), if e is F -distinctive, then B is fair. And
if e is not F -distinctive, then the fairness of B can be directly seen from the
description of the preinitialization stage. ✷
As mentioned earlier, we are going to use E as an environment’s strategy, so
that we will be interested in runs cospelled rather than spelled by computation
branches of E . This means that when analyzing how such runs are generated,
we should assume that the moves made by E get the label ⊥ rather than ⊤,
and the moves made by its adversary get the label ⊤ rather than ⊥.
For the rest of this section, let us agree on the following:
Convention 9.3.4 Suppose e is F -distinctive so that, according to Lemma
9.3.2(d), LOOP makes a finite, nonzero number of iterations in B. Then:
• l will denote the number of iterations of LOOP in B, so that the lth iteration
is the last iteration.
• Ei (where 1 ≤ i ≤ l) will denote the value of record E at the beginning of
the ith iteration of LOOP in B.
• fi (where 1 ≤ i ≤ l) will denote the value of record f at the beginning of the
ith iteration of LOOP in B.
• Ki (where 1 ≤ i ≤ l) will stand for fiEi.
• Θi (where 1 ≤ i ≤ l) will stand for the sequence of the moves made by the
players — in their normal order — by the beginning of the ith iteration of
LOOP in B, where the moves made by E are ⊥-labeled and the moves made
by its adversary ⊤-labeled.
Lemma 9.3.5 Suppose e is F -distinctive. Then, for every i with 1 ≤ i ≤ l
and every interpretation ∗, we have Θi ∈ Lr
K∗
1 and 〈Θi〉K∗1 = K
∗
i .
Proof. Assume e is F -distinctive. We proceed by induction on i. The basis
case with i = 1 is trivial taking into account that Θ1 = 〈〉. Now consider
an arbitrary i with 1 ≤ i < l. By the induction hypothesis, Θi ∈ Lr
K∗
1 and
〈Θi〉K∗1 = K
∗
i .
Suppose the ith iteration of LOOP in B deals with the case of Rule A. Then
E does not make a move during this iteration. Since i is not the last iteration,
the adversary should make a move α that satisfies the conditions of one of the
Subcases (i)-(iii), and then we will have Θi+1 = 〈Θi,⊤α〉. Analyzing how Ei
and fi are updated to Ei+1 and fi+1 in this case, in view of Lemma 7.8(b) it
is easy to see that then 〈⊤α〉 ∈ LrK
∗
i and 〈⊤α〉K∗i = K
∗
i+1, whence, with the
equalities K∗i = 〈Θi〉K
∗
1 and Θi+1 = 〈Θi,⊤α〉 in mind, we have Θi+1 ∈ Lr
K∗
1
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and 〈Θi+1〉K∗1 = K
∗
i+1.
Suppose now the ith iteration of LOOP deals with the case of one of the Rules
B1 or B2. Then the adversary does not move during this iteration. E makes
a one single move α so that Θi+1 = 〈Θi,⊥α〉. Again, analyzing what kind of
a move this α is and how Ei and fi are updated to Ei+1 and fi+1, in view
of Lemma 7.8(a) we can easily see that 〈⊥α〉 ∈ LrK
∗
i and 〈⊥α〉K∗i = K
∗
i+1,
whence, with the equalities K∗i = 〈Θi〉K
∗
1 and Θi+1 = 〈Θi,⊥α〉 in mind, we
have Θi+1 ∈ Lr
K∗
1 and 〈Θi+1〉K∗1 = K
∗
i+1. ✷
Lemma 9.3.6 Suppose e is F -distinctive, and Γ is the run cospelled by B.
Then, for any interpretation ∗ with WnK
∗
l
e 〈〉 = ⊥, we have Wn
F ∗
e 〈Γ〉 = ⊥.
Proof. Assume e is F -distinctive, B cospells Γ and WnK
∗
l
e 〈〉 = ⊥. By
Lemma 9.3.5, Θl ∈ Lr
K∗
1 and 〈Θl〉K∗1 = K
∗
l . Since Wn
K∗
l
e 〈〉 = ⊥, we then
have Wn〈Θl〉K
∗
1
e 〈〉 = ⊥, whence Wn
K∗
1
e 〈Θl〉 = ⊥, i.e. Wn
e[K∗
1
]〈Θl〉 = ⊥, i.e.
Wne[(f1E1)
∗]〈Θl〉 = ⊥. Then, remembering from the description of the initial-
ization stage that f1 agrees with e on all free variables of F and E1 = F ,
Lemma 7.7 yields Wne[F
∗]〈Θl〉 = ⊥, i.e.
WnF
∗
e 〈Θl〉 = ⊥. (16)
Back to Γ. Obviously Θl is an initial segment of Γ. Since El is derived by Rule
A (Lemma 9.3.2(e)), the lth iteration of LOOP deals with Case of Rule A. So,
E does not move during this iteration. If its adversary does not make moves
either, then Θl = Γ and, by (16), Wn
F ∗
e 〈Γ〉 = ⊥. Suppose now the adversary
makes a move α during the lth iteration. α cannot be a move that satisfies
the conditions of one of the Subcases (i)-(iii), for otherwise there would be an
(l+ 1)th iteration of LOOP. But if none of those three conditions is satisfied,
then it can be seen from Lemma 7.8(b) that we must have 〈⊤α〉 6∈ LrK
∗
l .
Consequently, by Lemma 9.3.5, 〈⊤α〉 6∈ Lr〈Θl〉K
∗
1 , whence 〈Θl,⊤α〉 6∈ Lr
K∗
1 ,
whence, in view of Lemmas 7.1 and 7.2, 〈Θl,⊤α〉 6∈ Lr
F ∗. But 〈Θl,⊤α〉 is an
initial segment of Γ, which makes Γ a ⊤-illegal and hence ⊥-won run of e[F ∗].
✷
To proceed with our proof of Proposition 9.3, we need to agree on some ad-
ditional terminology. In the following convention, when using set-theoretic
notation such as c ∈ ~c, we identify a tuple ~c of constants with the set of the
constants that appear in ~c.
Convention 9.3.7 Suppose ~a = (a1, . . . , ar) and ~b = (b1, . . . , br) are two r-
tuples of pairwise distinct constants. Let (a′1, . . . , a
′
m) be the result of deleting
in ~a all constants that are in ~b. Similarly, let (b′1, . . . , b
′
m) be the result of
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deleting in ~b all constants that are in ~a. We define the (~a,~b)-permutation as
the function h¯ : {constants} → {constants} such that, for every constant c,
we have:
• If c 6∈ (~a ∪~b), then h¯c = c.
• If c = bi ∈ ~b (1 ≤ i ≤ r), then h¯c = ai.
• If c = a′j ∈ (~a−~b) (1 ≤ j ≤ m), then h¯c = b
′
j.
The following statement is obvious:
Lemma 9.3.8 For any tuples ~a = (a1, . . . , ar) and ~b = (b1, . . . , br) of pairwise
distinct constants, the (~a,~b)-permutation is an effective, bijective function from
{constants} to {constants}.
For the rest of this section we assume that:
Assumption 9.3.9
• H1, . . . , Hk are all the instable proof formulas.
• G1(x11, . . . , x
1
r1
), . . . , Gk(x
k
1, . . . , x
k
rk
) are the elementarizations of H1, . . . , Hk,
respectively, where, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ k, we assume that xi1, . . . , x
i
ri
are all
the (pairwise distinct) free variables of Gi(x
i
1, . . . , x
i
ri
).
By a ∆2-interpretation we mean an interpretation that interprets each pred-
icate letter as a (finitary) predicate of complexity ∆2.
By Go¨del’s completeness theorem for classical predicate calculus — in partic-
ular, the version of the proof of that theorem as given in Section 72 of [14] —
for every formula G(w1, . . . , wr) of the classical language that is not (classi-
cally) valid and whose free variables are exactly w1, . . . , wr, there is a classical
model with domain {0, 1, 2, . . .} and an r-tuple a1, . . . , ar of pairwise distinct
objects of the domain such that, in that model,
• every predicate letter is interpreted as a predicate of complexity ∆2;
• G(a1, . . . , ar) is false.
Such a model is nothing but what we would call a perfect (see page 40) ∆2-
interpretation. Based on the above fact and taking into account that each of
the Gi(x
i
1, . . . , x
i
ri
) (1 ≤ i ≤ k) is a classically non-valid elementary formula,
we fix the following perfect ∆2-interpretations and tuples of constants:
Assumption 9.3.10 For each 1 ≤ i ≤ k,
• ⋆i is a perfect ∆2-interpretation and
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• ~ai = (ai1, . . . , a
i
ri
) are pairwise distinct constants such that Gi(a
i
1, . . . , a
i
ri
) is
false in ⋆i.
For each 1 ≤ i ≤ k and each n-ary predicate letter p, let
Api (u1, . . . , un) = p
⋆i
(of course, it is legitimate to assume that the attached tuple of each p⋆i comes
from the same pool u1, u2, . . . of variables).
Let us fix an effective encoding of tuples of pairwise distinct constants. We
assume that every such tuple has exactly one code, and vice versa: every
c0 ∈ {0, 1, . . .} is the code of exactly one tuple of pairwise distinct constants.
For each 1 ≤ i ≤ k and each n-ary predicate letter p, we define the predicate
Bpi (u0, u1, . . . , un)
by stipulating that, for any c0, . . . , cn, B
p
i (c0, . . . , cn) is true iff c0 is the code
of an ri-tuple ~b of pairwise distinct constants and, where h¯ is the (~ai,~b)-
permutation, Api (h¯c1, . . . , h¯cn) is true.
Since h¯ is an effective function and the complexity of Api is ∆2, we obviously
have:
Lemma 9.3.11 For any n-ary predicate letter p and any 1 ≤ i ≤ k, the
complexity of Bpi (u0, u1, . . . , un) is ∆2.
Remember that x1, . . . , xq are all the free variables of F . We also select and
fix an arbitrary variable s that does not occur in F . And we fix a constant d0
such that no constant occurring in F is greater than d0.
For each constant c, we define the valuation ec by stipulating that:
• ec(s) = c;
• ec(x1) = d0 + 1; . . . ; ec(xq) = d0 + q;
• for any other variable z, ec(z) = 0.
Notice that:
Lemma 9.3.12
a) For any constant c, ec is an F -distinctive valuation.
b) The function g defined by g(c, i) = ec(vi) is effective.
We fix the list H0, H1, H2, . . . of all HPMs arranged according to the lexi-
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cographic order of their (standardized) descriptions.
According to Lemma 9.3.3, E is fair. Hence, for every HPM H and valuation
f , the (E , f,H)-branch (see Lemma 3.3) is defined.
For each constant c, we define:
• Bc as the (E , ec,Hc)-branch, 17 and
• Γc as the Hc vs E run on ec, i.e. the run cospelled by Bc.
Note that, by Lemmas 9.3.12(a) and 9.3.2(d), LOOP is iterated a finite,
nonzero number of times in Bc.
Next, where 1 ≤ i ≤ k, we define the predicate Lasti(x, x′) by stipulating that,
for any constants c, c′,
• Lasti(c, c
′) is true iff we have:
· The value of record E in the last iteration of LOOP in Bc is Hi;
· c′ is the code of ~b, where ~b = b1, . . . , bri are the constants assigned to
the variables xi1, . . . , x
i
ri
by the value of record f in the last iteration of
LOOP in Bc. Note that, in view of Lemma 9.3.2(b), b1, . . . , bri are pairwise
distinct.
Lemma 9.3.13 For each 1 ≤ i ≤ k, the predicate Lasti(x, x′) has complexity
∆2.
Proof. Updates of records E and f generally may take several computation
steps. Let us call such steps (configurations of E) — together with the steps
within the preinitialization and initialization stages — transitional, and call all
other steps non-transitional. Thus, it is the non-transitional configurations in
which records E and f have definite values, with the former being a proof for-
mula and the latter being a finite valuation. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ k, let Ki(y, x, x′)
be the predicate such that Ki(n, c, c
′) is true iff the nth configuration of Bc is
non-transitional, the value of record E in that configuration is Hi, and c
′ is
the code of ~b, where ~b = b1, . . . , bri are the constants assigned to the variables
xi1, . . . , x
i
ri
by the value of record f in the nth configuration. In view of Lemmas
3.3(b) and 9.3.12(b), it is not hard to see that Ki is a decidable predicate. We
know that the values of records E and f should stabilize at some computation
step m of Bc and never change afterwards. In particular, such an m is the first
configuration of the last iteration of LOOP in Bc. With this fact in mind and
some little thought, we can find that Lasti(x, x
′) = ∃z∀y(y ≥ z → Ki(y, x, x′))
and ¬Lasti(x, x′) = ∃z∀y(y ≥ z → ¬Ki(y, x, x′)). This means that Lasti(x, x′)
has complexity ∆2. ✷
17 Not to confuse with the predicates Bpi .
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For any n-ary predicate letter p and any 1 ≤ i ≤ k, we now define the predicate
Cpi (s, u1, . . . , un) by
Cpi (s, u1, . . . , un) = ∃u0(Lasti(s, u0) ∧B
p
i (u0, u1, . . . , un)).
For each n-ary predicate letter p, we define the predicate Dp(u1, . . . , un) by
Dp(u1, . . . , un) = C
p
1(s, u1, . . . , un) ∨ . . . ∨ C
p
k(s, u1, . . . , un).
(Notice that Dp(u1, . . . , un) is generally n + 1-ary rather than n-ary, with s
being a hidden variable on which it depends.)
Lemma 9.3.14 The predicate Dp(u1, . . . , un) has complexity ∆2 (any n-ary
predicate letter p).
Proof. Disjunction preserves ∆2-complexity. So, in order to show that the
predicate Dp(u1, . . . , un) is of complexity ∆2, it would be sufficient to verify
that each disjunct Cpi (s, u1, . . . , un) (1 ≤ i ≤ k) of it has complexity ∆2. From
Lemmas 9.3.11 and 9.3.13, together with the fact that ∧ and ∃ preserve Σ2-
complexity, it is obvious that Cpi (s, u1, . . . , un) is of complexity Σ2. Thus, what
remains to show is that ¬Cpi (s, u1, . . . , un) is also of complexity Σ2. We claim
that
¬Cpi (s, u1, . . . , un) = ∃u0
(
∨{Lastj(s, u0) | j 6= i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}}
∨(Lasti(s, u0) ∧ ¬B
p
i (u0, u1, . . . , un))
) (17)
(∨S means the ∨-disjunction of the elements of S, understood as ⊥ when S
is empty). This claim can be verified based on the meanings of the predicates
Cpi and Lasti, and the observation that, for every (value of) s, there is exactly
one j ∈ {1, . . . , k} and exactly one (value of) u0 such that Lastj(s, u0) is true.
Details of this verification are left to the reader.
Now, from Lemmas 9.3.11 and 9.3.13, together with the fact that ∧, ∨ and ∃
preserve Σ2-complexity, (17) allows us to conclude that ¬C
p
i (s, u1, . . . , un) is
indeed of complexity Σ2. ✷
Now we define the interpretation ∗ by stipulating that, for each n-ary predicate
letter p,
p∗ = Dp(u1, . . . , un).
Lemma 9.3.14 then means that ∗ is a ∆2-interpretation. The fact that variable
s does not occur in F guarantees that this interpretation is F -admissible.
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What remains to show is that no HPM wins F ∗. We are going to do this by
proving that each Hc loses F ∗ against E on ec.
Lemma 9.3.15 Assume the following:
(1) c, c′ ∈ {constants} and i ∈ {1, . . . , k} are such that Lasti(c, c′) is true;
(2) ~b = (b1, . . . , bri) is the tuple of pairwise distinct constants encoded by c
′;
(3) h¯ is the (~ai,~b)-permutation.
Then, for any elementary formula J(z1, . . . , zn) whose free variables are exactly
z1, . . . , zn and any constants c1, . . . , cn, ec[(J(c1, . . . , cn))
∗] = (J(h¯c1, . . . , h¯cn))
⋆i.
Proof. Assume the conditions of the lemma are satisfied, and J(z1, . . . , zn)
is an elementary formula whose free variables are exactly z1, . . . , zn. We prove
the lemma by induction on the complexity of J(z1, . . . , zn).
For the basis of induction, we need to consider the case when J(z1, . . . , zn)
is atomic. The cases when it is ⊥ or ⊤ are trivial, so suppose J(z1, . . . , zn)
is a non-logical atom. For simplicity of representation and obviously without
loss of generality, we may assume that J(z1, . . . , zn) = p(z1, . . . , zn), where p
is an n-ary predicate letter. Then (J(c1, . . . , cn))
∗ = Dp(c1, . . . , cn). In turn,
Dp(c1, . . . , cn) = C
p
1 (s, c1, . . . , cn) ∨ . . . ∨ C
p
k(s, c1, . . . , cn). Thus,
ec[(J(c1, . . . , cn))
∗] = ec[C
p
1(s, c1, . . . , cn) ∨ . . . ∨ C
p
k(s, c1, . . . , cn)]. (18)
We obviously have
ec[C
p
1(s, c1, . . . , cn) ∨ . . . ∨ C
p
k(s, c1, . . . , cn)] =
Cp1(c, c1, . . . , cn) ∨ . . . ∨ C
p
k(c, c1, . . . , cn).
According to assumption (1) of the lemma, Lasti(c, c
′) is true. As noted earlier
in the proof of Lemma 9.3.14, i and c′ are unique values for which Lasti(c, c
′)
is true. Each component Cpj (c, c1, . . . , cn) in the above disjunction contains
(under ∃u0) the conjunct Lastj(c, u0) which is thus false when j 6= i, and
hence each such disjunct Cpj (c, c1, . . . , cn) can be deleted. So,
Cp1(c, c1, . . . , cn) ∨ . . . ∨ C
p
k(c, c1, . . . , cn) = C
p
i (c, c1, . . . , cn) =
∃u0(Lasti(c, u0) ∧ B
p
i (u0, c1, . . . , cn)).
Since c′ is the only constant for which Lasti(c, c
′) is true, ∃u0(Lasti(c, u0) ∧
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Bpi (u0, c1, . . . , cn)) can be equivalently rewritten as B
p
i (c
′, c1, . . . , cn). Thus,
∃u0(Lasti(c, u0) ∧ B
p
i (u0, c1, . . . , cn)) = B
p
i (c
′, c1, . . . , cn).
In turn, based on assumptions (2) and (3) of the lemma,
Bpi (c
′, c1, . . . , cn) = A
p
i (h¯c1 . . . , h¯cn).
Finally, notice that
Api (h¯c1 . . . , h¯cn) = (p(h¯c1 . . . , h¯cn))
⋆i = (J(h¯c1 . . . , h¯cn))
⋆i. (19)
From the chain of equations from (18) to (19) we get ec[(J(c1, . . . , cn))
∗] =
(J(h¯c1 . . . , h¯cn))
⋆i, which completes our proof of the basis case of induction.
For the inductive step, we will only consider the case when the main operator
of J(z1, . . . , zn) is ∃. The case with ∀ is similar, and the cases with ¬,∧,∨,→
are simpler or straightforward.
So, assume J(z1, . . . , zn) = ∃z0I(z0, z1, . . . , zn). Then (J(c1, . . . , cn))
∗ =
(∃z0I(z0, c1, . . . , cn))
∗ = ∃z0
(
(I(z0, c1, . . . , cn))
∗
)
and (J(h¯c1, . . . , h¯cn))
⋆i =
(∃z0I(z0, h¯c1, . . . , h¯cn))
⋆i = ∃z0
(
(I(z0, h¯c1, . . . , h¯cn))
⋆i
)
. Thus, we need to show
that ec
[
∃z0
(
(I(z0, c1, . . . , cn))
∗
)]
= ∃z0
(
(I(z0, h¯c1, . . . , h¯cn))
⋆i
)
. In other words,
show that ec
[
∃z0
(
(I(z0, c1, . . . , cn))
∗
)]
is true iff ∃z0
(
(I(z0, h¯c1, . . . , h¯cn))
⋆i
)
is
so. In what follows we implicitly rely on Lemma 7.2. Suppose ec
[
∃z0
(
(I(z0, c1,
. . . , cn))
∗
)]
is true. This means that there is a constant c0 such that ec[(I(c0, c1,
. . . , cn))
∗] is true. Then, by the induction hypothesis, (I(h¯c0, h¯c1, . . . , h¯cn))
⋆i
is true. In turn, this implies that ∃z0
(
(I(z0, h¯c1, . . . , h¯cn))
⋆i
)
is true. Now
suppose ∃z0
(
(I(z0, h¯c1, . . . , h¯cn))
⋆i
)
is true. This means that for some con-
stant d, (I(d, h¯c1, . . . , h¯cn))
⋆i is true. Since h¯ is a bijection (Lemma 9.3.8),
there is a constant c0 with h¯c0 = d. Then, by the induction hypothesis,
ec[(I(c0, c1, . . . , cn))
∗] is true. Consequently, ec
[
∃z0
(
(I(z0, c1, . . . , cn))
∗
)]
is true.
✷
Lemma 9.3.16 Hc does not win F ∗ against E on ec (any constant c).
Proof. Fix an arbitrary c. In what follows we rely on our Convention 9.3.1
with ec and Bc in the roles of e and B, respectively. That is, in the present
context ec and Bc should be understood as synonyms of to what the earlier
parts of the present section referred as e andB. The fact that ec is F -distinctive
(Lemma 9.3.12) allows us to use the notation established in Convention 9.3.4.
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According to Lemma 9.3.2(d), LOOP is iterated a finite (and nonzero) number
of times — in particular, l times in Bc. Then, by clauses (a) and (e) of Lemma
9.3.2, El is an instable proof formula. Hence El = Hi for one (and exactly
one as we assume that the CL3′-proof of F has no repetitions) of the i with
1 ≤ i ≤ k. Fix this i. Consider fl — the value of record f at the beginning of
the last iteration of LOOP in Bc. Let~b = (b1, . . . , bri) be the values returned for
x1, . . . , xri by fl, and let c
′ be the code of ~b. So, Lasti(c, c
′) is true. Let h¯ be the
(~ai,~b)-permutation. Thus, the three conditions of Lemma 9.3.15 are satisfied.
Then, according to that lemma, ec[(Gi(b1, . . . , bri))
∗] = (Gi(h¯b1, . . . , h¯bri))
⋆i.
But remembering the meaning of h¯, we have h¯b1 = a
i
1, . . . , h¯bri = a
i
ri
. Thus,
ec[(Gi(b1, . . . , bri))
∗] has the same truth value as (Gi(a
i
1, . . . , a
i
ri
))⋆i. According
to Assumption 9.3.10, the latter is false. Then so is the former, which can be
expressed by writing
Wn(Gi(b1,...,bri))
∗
ec 〈〉 = ⊥. (20)
We have El = Hi and hence Kl = flHi. This obviously implies that ‖Kl‖ =
fl‖Hi‖. In turn, by Assumption 9.3.9, ‖Hi‖ = Gi(xi1, . . . , x
i
ri
). And we also
have flGi(x
i
1, . . . , x
i
ri
) = Gi(b
i
1, . . . , b
i
ri
). Thus, ‖Kl‖ = Gi(b
i
1, . . . , b
i
ri
). By (20),
we then getWn‖Kl‖
∗
ec 〈〉 = ⊥. This, by Lemma 7.5, impliesWn
K∗
l
ec 〈〉 = ⊥. Then,
by Lemma 9.3.6, we getWnF
∗
ec 〈Γc〉 = ⊥. Thus Γc, which is the Hc vs E run on
ec, is a lost (by Hc) run of F ∗ with respect to ec, which means that Hc does
not win F ∗ against E on ec. ✷
Lemma 9.3.16 essentially completes our proof of Proposition 9.3: that Hc does
not win F ∗ against E on ec clearly means that it simply does not win F ∗. But
every HPM is Hc for some c. Hence, no HPM wins F ∗, and F is not valid. ✷
10 Decidability of the ∀, ∃-free fragment of CL3
This section is devoted to a proof of Theorem 5.7. Let F be an arbitrary for-
mula that does not contain blind quantifiers. The decidability of the question
CL3 ⊢ F can be shown by induction on the complexity of F .
F is provable iff it is derivable from some provable formulas by one of the Rules
A, B1, or B2. We define a procedure that tests, as described below, each of
these three possibilities. If one of those three tests succeeds, the procedure
returns “yes”, otherwise returns “no”.
Testing Rule A: This routine has the following three steps. The whole test
is considered to have succeeded iff each of those three steps succeed.
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Step 1: Check whether F is stable, i.e. whether ‖F ‖ is classically valid. Note
that the latter does not contain any quantifiers. The question of classical
validity of a quantifier-free formula is, of course, decidable. Thus, this step
takes only a finite amount of time. If F is stable, the step has succeeded.
Otherwise it has failed.
Step 2: For each positive (resp. negative) surface occurrence of a subformula
G1⊓ . . .⊓Gn (resp. G1⊔ . . .⊔Gn) in F and each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, see if H is provable,
where H the result of replacing in F the above occurrence by Gi. Just like F ,
H does not contain blind quantifiers, and its complexity is lower than that
of F . Hence, by the induction hypothesis, testing whether CL3 ⊢ H takes a
finite amount of time. Obviously there is only a finite number of such Hs to
test, so the whole Step 2 takes a finite amount of time. If all of such Hs turn
out to be provable, then the step has succeeded. Otherwise it has failed.
Step 3: For each positive (resp. negative) surface occurrence of a subformula
⊓xG(x) (resp. ⊔xG(x)) in F , see if H is provable, where H the result of
replacing in F the above occurrence by G(y), where y is the smallest (in the
lexicographic order) variable not occurring in F . As in the previous step, H is
∀,∃-free and its complexity is lower than that of F , whence, by the induction
hypothesis, testing whether CL3 ⊢ H takes a finite amount of time. Also,
again there is only a finite number of such Hs to test, so the whole Step 3
takes a finite amount of time. If all of such Hs turn out to be provable, then
the step has succeeded. Otherwise it has failed.
Before we describe how the other rules are tested, let us verify that F is
derivable by Rule A iff each of the above three steps (and hence the whole
test) succeeds.
Assume all three steps succeed. Success of Step 1 means that F is stable.
And success of Steps 2 and 3 obviously means that there is ~H that satisfies
conditions (i) and (ii) of Rule A. Hence F is derivable from that ~H by Rule
A.
Now assume one of the three steps fails. We want to show that then one of the
conditions of Rule A is violated for F as a possible conclusion of that rule.
Indeed: Failure of Step 1 means that the condition of stability of F is violated.
Failure of Step 2 obviously means that there is no set ~H of formulas that would
satisfy condition (i) of RuleA. Suppose now Step 3 fails. In particular, there is
a positive (resp. negative) occurrence of a subformula⊓xG(x) (resp.⊔xG(x))
in F such that CL3 6⊢ H , where H is the result of replacing in F the above
occurrence by G(y), with y being the smallest variable not occurring in F . Let
us write H as H(y). In view of Lemma 9.1, for any variable y′ not occurring
in F , we would also have CL3 6⊢ H(y′). This obviously means that no set ~H
of formulas satisfies condition (ii) of Rule A.
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Each of the following two routines takes a finite amount of time for the same
reasons as the routines of the above-described Steps 2 and 3 did.
Testing Rule B1: For each negative (resp. positive) surface occurrence of a
subformula G1 ⊓ . . .⊓Gn (resp. G1 ⊔ . . .⊔Gn) in F and each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, see if
H is provable, where H the result of replacing in F the above occurrence by
Gi. If one of such Hs turns out to be provable, then the test has succeeded.
Otherwise it has failed. Clearly F is derivable by Rule B1 iff this test succeeds.
Testing Rule B2: For each negative (resp. positive) surface occurrence of a
subformula ⊓xG(x) (resp. ⊔xG(x)) in F , do the following:
Step 1: See if H is provable, where H the result of replacing in F the above oc-
currence of ⊓xG(x) (resp. ⊔xG(x)) by G(y), where y is the smallest variable
not occurring in F .
Step 2: For each free term t of F such that (if t is a variable) neither the above
occurrence of ⊓xG(x) (resp. ⊔xG(x)) in F nor any of the free occurrences
of x in G(x) are in the scope of ∀t or ∃t, see if H is provable, where H the
result of replacing in F the above occurrence of ⊓xG(x) (resp. ⊔xG(x)) by
G(t).
If one of the above Hs turns out to be provable, then the test has succeeded.
Otherwise it has failed.
With Lemma 9.1 in mind, a little thought can convince us that F is derivable
by Rule B2 iff this test succeeds.
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